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The Last Days of Col. William O. Darby: An Eye-Witness Account

Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr.

Brig. Gen. William O. Darby, whose final promotion was approved by President Harry S. Truman fifteen days after Darby's death, led the Army's first special forces units in North Africa and Italy during World War II. The following report describes Darby's last wartime assignment as assistant commander of the 10th Mountain Division. Second Lt. Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr., who had served as Darby's senior aide-de-camp, wrote this report in August 1945. In preparing the report for this publication, Mr. Templeton added the words in parentheses; the words in brackets were added by the managing editor.

During the early afternoon of 25 April 1945, I returned to 10th Mountain Division headquarters, which was located on the northern outskirts of San Benedetto [Italy]. For two days I had been to the rear attending Brig. Gen. Robinson E. Duff's baggage and personal belongings and checking on him personally at Castelfranco, where he had been hospitalized following the wounds he incurred in our rapid advance to the Po River on 22 April. As I got out of the 1 1/2-ton truck, Lt. Muldrow Garrison hailed me and, after asking about Duff's condition, said that we had a new boss—Colonel Darby of the Rangers—and that we should be prepared to take off at any moment with him on the mission which had been assigned to Task Force DARBY—the capture of Verona. (Task Force DARBY was composed of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, the 13th Tank Battalion, the 1125th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, Company B of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company B of the 751st Tank Battalion, and elements of the 126th Engineer Battalion and the 10th Medical Battalion.)

I immediately went to General Duff's van, which Colonel Darby had taken over by that time, and introduced myself. Darby greeted me in what I should call his typically friendly, efficient manner and came straight to the point: "Templeton, there are just two things I want you to be sure to do. First, be able to keep me informed at all times of our position, and secondly, don't let me do anything stupid!" I assured him I would try to do my best in these matters, but at that very moment I had misgivings about the second assign-

Colonel Darby in southern Italy in April 1944, while commanding the 179th Infantry
(Signal Corps photograph)

ment. Only nine days of staying on the heels of General Duff had been enough to convince me that keeping assistant division commanders out of trouble presented even more difficulties and frustrations than the camel's passing through the eye of the needle. If Colonel Darby were to operate in the same manner as had Duff, I knew that every day we would find ourselves in "hot spots," any one of which might prove disastrous.

Later that afternoon (25 April), about 1800 hours, Task Force DARBY started to move across the Po River. This crossing had been delayed for several hours because of last minute bridging difficulties. During the preceding three days, the 85th and 87th Mountain Infantry Regiments had established and expanded our bridgehead on the north bank of the Po. Colonel Darby in his jeep proceeded to the head of his task force column shortly after its leading elements had crossed the Po. He then drove on ahead in order to make certain that the 1st Battalion of the 85th had cleared the route and successfully reached Villafranca, about ten miles southwest of Verona. Darby reached Villafranca shortly after 1900 hours and ascertained from Lt. Col. [Donald J.] Woolley, commander of the 1st Battalion, that the entire town and neighboring airfield had been secured so that everything was in readiness for Task Force DARBY to pass through for its assault on Verona.

Darby then left Villafranca and returned along Highway 62 to the head of his task force, which by this time had moved up to a point within about five miles of Villafranca. Darkness had fallen, but a nearly full moon provided good visibility. A lone German plane made an unsuccessful strafing attack on the road at this time. The task force had been able to move rapidly because almost the entire organic supply of the division's vehicles, unable to cross the Po prior to 1800 hours on the 25th, was available for transporting the 86th Regiment to assembly areas near Villafranca.

About 2200 hours the commanders of the various task force elements conferred with Darby at Colonel Woolley's command post in a small stone house on the northern outskirts of Villafranca. By the "midnight oil" in a crowded room, Darby spelled out with the aid of various maps his plan of attack on Verona and issued his final orders. On this occasion I remember being particularly impressed by Darby's carefully and minutely worked-out tactics, as well as by his lucid and vigorous explanation of the plan of attack to his subordinate commanders. Yet, at the same time, he called for full suggestions from his subordinates and carefully integrated their observations and recommendations into his final plans. The conference broke up about 0100 hours on 26 April.

Throughout the night a number of German vehicles stumbled into the outposts that the 1st Battalion

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of the 85th had established around Villafranca. The sky to the north was repeatedly lit up with the flashes of what we presumed were German ammunition dumps being blown up, either by partisans or by the Germans themselves. As we discovered the following morning, those flashes may also have marked the German demolition of the old stone bridges in Verona that crossed the Adige River.

At 0400 hours Task Force DARBY began the advance on Verona. The main force of one battalion of the 86th Regiment and attached tanks moved down Highway 62 and dispersed small pockets of resistance before reaching the outskirts of the city. A second force composed of another battalion of the 86th and attached tanks closed in on the city along a secondary road which roughly paralleled Highway 62 about one mile to the west. Both of these columns began their penetrations into the city proper about 0530, shortly after dawn. Meeting only scattered and disconnected groups of enemy personnel, the infantry and tanks quickly cleared the entire city south of the Adige. The main body of German troops had apparently already fled north from the city into the Italian Alps. [Elements of the 85th Infantry Division's 351st Infantry, motoring up Highway 12 from Ostiglia, had already entered Verona the previous evening and by dawn had largely silenced German opposition there.] Colonel Darby himself had moved forward to direct these final operations and rode through the streets on a tank. The jubilant welcome of the Italians jamming the streets and leaning out windows was truly heartwarming.

After satisfying himself by means of a personal inspection that the Germans had effectively demolished every bridge across the Adige within the city, Darby ordered his task force to swing northwest along the southern bank of the Adige, with the objectives of capturing Bussolengo about seven miles from Verona and trying to take any Adige bridges that might remain intact between Verona and Bussolengo. One battalion of the 86th was ordered to mop up the Verona area and temporarily police the city.

Darby returned to Villafranca at 1000 hours (on 26 April), where he reported to the division commander, Maj. Gen. George P. Hays, at the advance division command post. Hays called a conference of his staff and organizational commanders, and by noon it was decided that the division would swing westward and

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

Chief of Military History
Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle

Managing Editor
Charles Hendricks, Ph.D.

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continue its advance northward along the eastern shores of Lake Garda, rather than try to cross the Adige and pursue the Germans up Highway 12, the main route to the Brenner Pass.

During the early afternoon Darby returned to Verona and then followed the route of his task force northwest from the city, arriving at Bussolengo about 1600 hours. A wooden bridge crossing the Adige had been found intact in the vicinity of Bussolengo, so that infantry patrols of Task Force DARBY had crossed the river and were patrolling the northern bank. A few German vehicles were intercepted trying to flee northward on Highway 12. Darby recalled these patrols to the southern bank of the Adige and, in line with the division's new objective, ordered one battalion of the 86th with supporting tanks to continue the drive westward and by nightfall to seize Lazise on the southeastern shores of Lake Garda, thus sealing off a possible German escape route along the highway running northward on the eastern shores of Lake Garda.

This final mission to capture Lazise was successful. In one day of operations, Task Force DARBY had not only spearheaded the second longest, 24-hour divisional advance of the campaign (22.5 miles), but also had successfully cleared all enemy personnel from the area of its advance and had physically occupied a thirteen-mile front along the southern bank of the Adige from Verona to Bussolengo [and overland] to Lazise. Thus ended Task Force DARBY.

On 27 April the division's advance up the eastern shores of Lake Garda was continued by means of regimental and battalion leap-frog operations performed by the 85th and 87th with supporting tanks. Darby's mission was to keep in close contact with our leading elements and provide General Hays with on-the-spot information. He succeeded in doing this so well that, on entering a house in the town of Garda, he could have eaten the German officers' luncheon, which was still warm on their plates. Another twenty-mile advance was made on this day to Malcesine, just ten miles short of the northern end of the lake.

On 28 April the 86th Regiment passed through the 85th, but the advance that day was limited to five miles because the Germans had successfully blown the first of six tunnels through which the road passed at this point. The attempts of the partisans, whom we had instructed to try to prevent possible demolition, had failed. The cliffs rose so sharply and so high from the edge of the lake that the advance was continued by means of an amphibious operation (using the DUKWs which had remained with the division since the initial crossing of the Po), supported by tank destroyers and artillery. This operation caught the German paratroops and SS men, who had been fighting us in this region, off balance, so that the remaining tunnels were captured intact on the 28th and 29th.

One incident during the morning of the 29th deserves attention. Colonel Darby went forward by means of a speedboat (to get around the blown-out tunnel) and then by jeep to investigate the progress of the 3d Battalion of the 86th, which had been held up because of enemy direct fire into the fifth tunnel by SP [self-propelled] guns (88s) at the head of the lake. [Five men had been killed and approximately fifty wounded by a German shell that exploded ten yards into the tunnel.]

General Hays joined him a short time later to look over the situation. About noon, both Darby and Hays climbed into a speedboat that had come up to that tunnel and sped out into the lake to return to the division command post. In a matter of seconds, a shell burst in the water about fifty yards to the right rear of the boat. The driver "turned on the gas," going back down the lake as fast as possible. Seven more shells burst about the same distance wide and short as the boat scooted the next half mile before swinging in for cover behind a small promontory of land. No sooner had this maneuver been executed than the engine died—out of gas! Fortunately, the Krauts had not been as accurate in their naval gunnery as they had been in zeroing in on the mouth of tunnel number 5.

All during the 28th and 29th we could observe German vehicles fleeing northward on Highway 45,

A 10th Mountain Division staff conference near the northern end of Lake Garda, April 1945
(Courtesy of the Denver Public Library, Western History Department; photo by Richard A. Rocker)



Protected by one of seven road tunnels on the eastern shore of Lake Garda, an American howitzer aims across the lake, April 1945.
(Courtesy of the Denver Public Library, Western History Department; photo by Richard A. Rocker)

which ran along the shore on the opposite side of the lake. Our attached British 5.5[-inch gun]s opened up periodically on this traffic. At 2400 hours on 29 April, Darby took charge of an amphibious operation which involved sending Company K of the 85th across the lake in DUKWs to seize Gargnano and thus cut the escape route up Highway 45. This operation was successfully completed by 0200 hours on 30 April. Later in the morning Darby and other division officers crossed the lake to inspect Mussolini's mansion and estate on the outskirts of Gargnano.

Other elements of the 85th were ferried across the lake, so that by noon of 30 April the division had two columns closing in on the town of Riva at the head of the lake. The advance was slow for the 86th on the east side of the lake, however, because the Germans were able to bring accurate fire on our troops and small vehicles as a result of the 88-mm. SPs being situated on the roads going up the hills and mountains above the head of the lake. Nevertheless, the 86th had taken Torbole and was pushing on toward Riva, just three miles away. The engineers had not quite finished clearing the blown rock from tunnel number 1, so that

75-mm. pack howitzers were the only answer our troops had to the 88s. The British were supposed to be sailing their big guns up to the head of the lake on Italian fishing boats, but they had not yet appeared.

About 1400 hours on 30 April, Darby went forward by DUKW to Torbole. The Germans, on high ground to the north, had almost perfect observation of our supply and troop movements in this area. After landing, Darby walked immediately to the 86th regimental command post, which was located in a two-story stone house close to the waterfront. For about half an hour he conferred with the regimental commander and his staff concerning pushing the attack northward from Torbole and Riva toward Trento and Bolzano. About three minutes before Darby concluded this conference, a single 88-mm. round was heard bursting somewhere nearby in the town. Of course, the Germans, seeing our DUKWs put in and out of Torbole, had periodically shelled the town's waterfront that day but had not inflicted any serious damage on us. Nevertheless, why just one round should come in was a question that should certainly have given pause to any artilleryman and also, perhaps, to any battlewise infantryman.

American troops in Torbole learn of the German surrender in Italy, 3 May 1945.
(Courtesy of the Denver Public Library, Western History Department)

Darby left the room and walked outside, intending to take a jeep back along the eastern shore to examine the road and tunnels. Since the engineers were supposed to have unblocked tunnel number 1 at any hour now, he wanted to make sure that everything was clear for a rapid movement forward of tanks and heavy artillery to give proper support to the projected infantry attack into the mountains to the north. Darby paused for a few minutes to discuss one or two other matters with the regimental commander and with Brig. Gen. David L. Ruffner, the division artillery commander, who had also come forward to Torbole at this time. The regimental jeep came around the corner and pulled up next to the house near Darby, ready to take him on his mission. I was about to climb into the back seat of the jeep but decided to wait a minute since Darby seemed to be continuing his conversation. I had just begun to feel a little nervous and anxious to be on the move when the barrage struck, the explosion of the 88-mm. shells coming apparently at the very moment we heard the whine. Only two or three of the initial shells landed along the waterfront, but just one of those produced the small fragment that killed Darby instantly and yet left General Ruffner and his aide, who were standing right next to Darby, untouched.

Of the dozen men in the immediate area, about half were wounded, but only Darby and one other man [M. Sgtö John T. Evans, the regimental sergeant major] were killed. The real tragedy of the incident was that it should never have happened; the Germans had actually tipped us off by firing that single preliminary round. And I had failed to realize in time that this was the moment to prevent Colonel Darby from doing something "stupid." [The German forces in Italy surrendered to the Allies two days later.]

Kenneth S. Templeton, Jr., served in the 10th Mountain Division, both as an officer and an enlisted man, from 1943 to 1946. He subsequently worked with philanthropic foundations in Indianapolis and San Francisco.

The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

I've reached a new milestone as a "frequent flyer." The desk clerks at the USAir and United ticket counters now recognize me (even out of uniform) when I do my duffel-bag drag into National Airport. But it is *important* that I see the Army at work, so I'll continue to go where the action is.

In the past three months, I've participated in the Division Commander/TRADOC Commandant Conference, addressed two graduating classes at TRADOC schools, accompanied the ASA (M&RA) to VMI to check on the school's assimilation of female cadets and Army ROTC program, visited the NCO Museum at the direction of General Reimer, and helped launch the Army's Museum Training Course. This course is designed to teach, through hands-on practice, the best techniques for curators to support our installations and schools.

I had a chance to get to Heidelberg for a short visit with the USAREUR staff. We discussed the critical role to be played by the Army History Program into the future. I also dropped by the 1st Armored Division's Historical Holding in Baumholder.

Wherever I go, I'm reminded again of the old, true adage: "The job that gets done is the one the Boss checks on." Whether we're talking about museums, heritage training, officer and NCO education, published history, or staff rides and field services, I find that saying to be accurate. Command involvement in our programs has been, and will continue to be, the key to success.

Thank goodness, there are examples everywhere of commanders who are personally engaged. They are demanding that their command historians and museum curators perform to the highest professional standards. It makes all the difference in the world!

I'm here to tell you that if you have a person in one of those key positions who is NOT meeting your expectations, I'll do whatever I can to help you with staff assistance visits or extra attention from the CMH staff. Just call on us.

Be on the look out for our newly published account of how USAREUR supported DESERT STORM. Entitled *From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: U. S. Army, Europe and the Gulf War*, it is a really useful study in multi-echelon operations. And, honestly, no kidding—the Center is going to publish a *combat* history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam this summer.

We said farewell this spring to a great member of the CMH team, COL Clyde Jonas. Clyde made a major contribution to our plans for relocating the Center while serving as chief of the Histories Division. We wish Clyde and his wife Judy all the best in retirement. I'm very happy to announce that Dr. Richard Stewart, currently the Director of History and Museums for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, has accepted the appointment as the new Histories Division chief. With his arrival, we turn over a new leaf in the history of the Center. For the first time, all of the divisions of CMH are headed by civilian professionals.

I want to close this short column with a heartfelt "Thank You" to all of you who made the time and took the effort to respond to my requests for feedback/critique of our Army Historical Program Strategic Plan. Your thoughts have been key in shaping our future. We are on the move now. We jump our TOC to Ft. McNair in August. Ribbon cutting is 1 September. I'll send out a net call when HISTORY 6 is set on position.

Hooah!

The Cold War Comes to Fort Monmouth

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and the Search for Spies in the Signal Corps

Rebecca R. Raines

This article is a revised version of a paper that Mrs. Raines delivered in Arlington, Virginia, at the 1996 Conference of Army Historians.

One of the major consequences of World War II was the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union to leadership roles in world affairs. Although the two nations had fought as allies during the war, the partnership between the superpowers dissolved quickly once they had defeated the Axis. Beginning with the breakdown of the joint occupation arrangements in Germany, Europe became separated into east and west. To use Winston Churchill's evocative metaphor, an Iron Curtain descended across the Continent. The era began that contemporaries quickly labeled the Cold War. With this sudden turn of events, the United States struggled to come to grips with the implications of the competitive postwar environment. In this climate of heightened anxiety, the U.S. Army Signal Corps became caught up in a controversial investigation of alleged subversive activity within the Army that seemed to threaten the victory it had so recently won.

Despite the uncertainties of the postwar world, the return of peace brought the usual cycle of demobilization to the U.S. Army. The Signal Corps, which had numbered over 350,000 officers and enlisted men at its wartime peak, shrank dramatically to 56,000 officers and men by June 1946.[1] The branch, nonetheless, continued its important work of providing the Army with its tactical and strategic communications networks. It also conducted research on the development of new communications equipment at its complex of laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, the home of the Signal Corps since World War I.

The Fort Monmouth research complex consisted of three major components. The Evans Signal Laboratory was the center of the Signal Corps' work on radar, which had proven to be one of the Allies' most potent tools during World War II. A historic milestone occurred at Evans in January 1946 when Signal Corps scientists first successfully bounced radar signals off the moon. This achievement, the outcome of the Corps' Project Diana, paved the way for enhanced long-distance electronic communications by means of artificial satellites, although these devices were a decade away. The Coles Signal Laboratory was the location of the Army's work on radio and wire equipment, and the Squier Signal Laboratory specialized in the development of power units, batteries, and photographic items.[2] In the early 1950s approximately 4,500 civilian scientists and support personnel worked at the Signal Corps laboratories, a staff much reduced from the more than 14,000 employed during their heyday in World War II.[3]

With wartime economic restrictions removed, America's economy boomed in the immediate postwar years. But the threat of nuclear war soon cast a shadow over the nation's prosperity. In 1949 the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb, thereby shattering the sense of security Americans had derived from their monopoly on atomic weapons. That same year also witnessed the takeover of China by a Communist regime led by Mao Zedong. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 further eroded the nation's confidence, particularly when Task Force Smith met with defeat in the opening days of the conflict. The subsequent intervention by Chinese Communist forces, aided by Soviet materiel, further increased world tensions and raised the specter of a possible third world war.

The sense of insecurity generated in America by these and other events underlay the considerable popularity of the strident anti-Communist crusade undertaken by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, a Republican from Wisconsin. Beginning in 1950 McCarthy set out to demonstrate that members of the American Communist party had heavily infiltrated the United States government. In an atmosphere of growing paranoia, many Americans proved susceptible to the idea that a pervasive "Red menace" threatened their society from within. McCarthy's allegations gained credence from the conviction for perjury in January 1950 of former State Department official Alger Hiss for denying under

oath Whittaker Chambers' charges that Hiss had passed secret documents to the Soviets. The Hiss trials—the first resulted in a hung jury—also proved a springboard for the political career of an outspokenly anti-Communist young congressman from California, Richard M. Nixon. Meanwhile, the revelation that Klaus Fuchs, a British physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project, was a Communist spy provided further evidence of a widespread Communist conspiracy.

McCarthy began his campaign by claiming to have a list of names of Communists working in the State Department. Although a congressional investigation failed to substantiate his allegations, McCarthy was not deterred. Against the backdrop of the Korean War, which was becoming much more than the "police action" the Truman administration termed it, McCarthy fanned the fears of anxious Americans. For the next two years, he hammered away at the administration, accusing it of being soft on communism. He even accused fellow senators of having Communists on their staffs.[4] His ardent campaign against American Communists quickly catapulted McCarthy into the public spotlight.

Senator McCarthy won reelection in the Republican landslide of 1952 that swept Dwight D. Eisenhower into the White House. With the Republicans in control of both houses of Congress, albeit by slim margins, McCarthy became chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations and also of its investigative arm, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The subcommittee had been created to conduct inquiries into financial fraud and abuse, but McCarthy used it to launch a probe into subversion within the government. His efforts followed in the footsteps of the House Un-American Activities Committee, which had exposed Alger Hiss and had attempted to eliminate Communists from Hollywood.

Since the onset of the Cold War, the federal government had taken a number of vigorous steps to ensure the loyalty of its employees. During the late 1940s and early 1950s stringent loyalty programs had been initiated. The attorney general kept a list of organizations considered subversive, and any government employee who belonged to one of them was liable to have his or her loyalty questioned. Each department had established loyalty boards to conduct such inquiries. Meanwhile, the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover used its considerable powers to carry out surveillance of citizens suspected of subversive activities.

After failing to flush any Communists from the State Department, McCarthy in 1953 redirected his attention to a potentially more explosive target: the U.S. Army. The Signal Corps became a particular focus of his zealous search for subversives. In a sensational trial just two years earlier, jurors had convicted Julius and Ethel Rosenberg on charges of passing atomic secrets to the Soviets, and they were both sentenced to death. Their trip to the electric chair in June 1953 coincided closely with the start of McCarthy's Signal Corps probe. During World War II Julius Rosenberg had worked for the Signal Corps at Fort Monmouth, and McCarthy in 1953 set out to prove that Rosenberg had created a spy ring at the post that was still in operation.

The Army had looked into security at Fort Monmouth the previous year after an East German scientist who had defected to the West claimed that he had seen a large number of microfilmed documents from that installation. Both the Signal Corps and the FBI conducted investigations, but neither found evidence of missing documents or espionage.[5] Moreover, the Army could have legally provided scientific documents to the Soviets during the war under Lend-Lease agreements. During World War II the Soviet Union had maintained official representatives at Fort Monmouth, who were given access to classified materials.[6] These possible explanations, however, did not satisfy the senator from Wisconsin.

Maj. Gen. Kirke B. Lawton, Fort Monmouth's commander, had sparked McCarthy's probe by secretly alerting the senator's subcommittee to the possibility of subversion at his facility. Lawton had assumed command at Fort Monmouth in December 1951, after having served as the deputy chief signal officer in Washington. Lawton was reluctant to cooperate with McCarthy publicly, however, until Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens ordered him to do so. With the possibility of a hot new trail to follow, the recently married McCarthy cut short his honeymoon in the West Indies to launch the inquiry personally.[7]

On 31 August 1953, McCarthy's subcommittee began closed hearings in New York City on subversion and espionage in the Signal Corps. The seven-member subcommittee included Republican Senators Everett

M. Dirksen of Illinois, Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota, and Charles E. Potter of Michigan and Democrats John L. McClellan of Arkansas, W. Stuart Symington of Missouri, and Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson of Washington. Working closely with the chairman was the subcommittee's chief counsel, Roy M. Cohn, a brash, young New York attorney who had helped to convict the Rosenbergs.[8] As the subcommittee's Democratic members promptly walked out in protest of McCarthy's inquisitorial tactics, and the other Republican members rarely attended, McCarthy and Cohn completely dominated the hearings. A few days before the hearings began, General Lawton had suspended several Fort Monmouth employees as security risks. One of these individuals was Aaron Coleman, a radar specialist who had worked at Monmouth for fifteen years. Coleman admitted to the subcommittee that he had known Julius Rosenberg when both were students at the City College of New York, but he denied having seen him since that time. He further denied being a Communist himself. Coleman stated that he had not known that Rosenberg had worked for the Signal Corps until he had read about it during the latter's trial.

McCarthy questioned Coleman at length about an official reprimand he had received in 1946 for taking home classified documents. Coleman explained that he had needed the documents to work overtime on an important project. He claimed that he had received proper authorization to remove the documents from the post but had been reprimanded for not keeping them in a secure location at his home. McCarthy was not appeased. He had his ammunition, and he knew how to use it. The senator declared in a press conference that Coleman may have been the link between the Signal Corps laboratories and the documents in East Germany.[9] Although he produced no evidence to support this allegation, McCarthy's campaign against the Army gained momentum.

Secretary of the Army Stevens tried to cooperate with McCarthy, although he denied the senator's assertions that espionage activity persisted at Fort Monmouth. As evidence of his goodwill, Stevens accompanied McCarthy on a tour of Fort Monmouth on 20 October. He also instructed General Lawton to lift an order banning Monmouth employees from speaking with members of the subcommittee.[10] At the same time, however, Stevens became worried that Lawton had taken his order to cooperate too literally, as the number of suspensions at Fort Monmouth continued to grow. Stevens took his concerns to Chief Signal Officer Maj. Gen. George I. Back, who promised to speak with Lawton.[11] For whatever reason, the suspension of Monmouth employees soon ceased. None of the suspended individuals had been accused of espionage. They were punished for being poor security risks on the basis of their past behavior or their associations with known or suspected Communists.

After six weeks of closed-door sessions, the subcommittee opened its public hearings on 24 November in the same New York courtroom where the Rosenbergs had been tried.[12] The first witness to appear was Col. Walter E. Lotz, Jr. Then assigned to the Engineering and Technical Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in Washington, the division which supervised the branch's research and development program, Lotz had served several tours at Fort Monmouth, both before and after World War II. Cohn questioned Lotz about the types of research undertaken by the Corps. He focused particular attention on the proximity fuze, an electronic device that uses a tiny radar to detect its target and detonate a bomb in flight. Lotz testified that Julius Rosenberg had, during his Signal Corps employment, been an inspector at one of the firms with which the Army had contracted to work on the fuze, a project classified as secret.[13]

From his cell in a federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania, meanwhile, Julius Rosenberg's brother-in-law, David Greenglass, gave the subcommittee a deposition that supported this line of inquiry. Greenglass had been convicted of espionage along with the Rosenbergs in the atomic weapons case, but he had not been sentenced to death. In his deposition he testified to the existence of a Rosenberg spy ring at Fort Monmouth. He claimed that Julius had told him that he had stolen the proximity fuze and given it to the Soviets. He accomplished his thievery, Greenglass explained, by putting items into the briefcase in which he carried his lunch. Apparently, no one ever checked its contents. After the war, Greenglass and Julius Rosenberg had opened an engineering business together in New York. Greenglass stated that Rosenberg had used his Signal Corps contacts to obtain contracts for their firm. Greenglass further testified that, as far as he knew, the spy ring at Monmouth continued in operation despite



General Lawton welcomes Washington officials to Fort Monmouth in October 1953. Pictured from left are General Back; Secretary of the Army Stevens; Senator H. Alexander Smith, a New Jersey Republican; Senator McCarthy; General Lawton; and Roy Cohn. (Signal Corps photo)

the demise of the Rosenbergs.[14]

During the following weeks, McCarthy called before his subcommittee a host of individuals, including many former Signal Corps employees. Most of these witnesses refused to testify, citing the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. Calling these individuals "Fifth Amendment Communists," McCarthy turned their refusal into an admission of guilt and accused them of hiding behind the Constitution, a document that, he alleged, they were seeking to destroy.

McCarthy further claimed that the Communist party had organized a special cell, called the Shore Club unit, specifically to infiltrate Fort Monmouth. Frustrated by one witness's repeated invocations of the Fifth when asked about the Shore Club, the senator angrily compared him to Julius Rosenberg and accused him of being "involved in the same type of filthy activities against your country." Although McCarthy presented no hard evidence to link the two men, the senator continued his line of attack. At one point he declared, "Rosenberg has been executed and you are walking the streets free. Do you not feel that if Rosenberg was properly executed, you deserve the same fate?" The witness, a former Fort Monmouth employee named Marcel Ullman, continued to plead the Fifth in response to most of McCarthy's questions, but declared that he would not willingly harm the nation.[15]

McCarthy also interrogated employees of firms that did business with the Army. He focused particularly on the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories, a Signal Corps subcontractor. McCarthy contended that the company, like the Signal Corps, had been infiltrated by Communists. While the subcom-

mittee showed that a small number of Communists had worked at the company, it could not link them to any acts of espionage.[16]

The hearings adjourned on 17 December for a Christmas break. During this interlude the *New York Times* ran a three-part series on the situation at Fort Monmouth which emphasized that the Army had already tightened security at the post before McCarthy's probe began. On 14 January 1954, the *Times* published an editorial urging its readers to refuse to accept McCarthy's charges until corroborated. In the editor's opinion, "Senator McCarthy's shameless scramble for publicity has never been exposed more clearly than in the Monmouth case."[17]

The subcommittee's public hearings resumed in February 1954. With his investigation into the spy ring at Fort Monmouth at a standstill, McCarthy set out in a new direction. He now aimed to prove that a Communist then working for the Signal Corps as a code clerk had access to top secret messages. He identified this individual as Mrs. Annie Lee Moss of Washington, D.C. McCarthy further alleged that the Army had full knowledge of Moss's Communist affiliation but had not moved to have her fired. The chief witness against Moss was an FBI agent, Mary S. Markward, who had infiltrated the Communist party in the Washington, D.C., area. Markward had served as treasurer of the local Communist cell and claimed that a woman named Annie Lee Moss had been a card-carrying member during the 1940s. At that time, Moss was a cafeteria worker at the Pentagon. Mrs. Moss had later been hired as a code clerk in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. Markward could not, however, attest to whether Mrs. Moss was still a party member and did not believe she had ever met the woman. As Mrs. Moss did not attend the hearing due to ill health, Mrs. Markward could not be asked to identify her by sight. In any case, she wasn't sure that she would be able to recognize her.

When Mrs. Moss finally appeared before the subcommittee the following month, the reliability of Markward's testimony became suspect. Poorly educated and not very articulate, Mrs. Moss hardly fit the image of a Communist spy. As a result of the allegations against her, she had been suspended from her job with the Signal Corps. Mrs. Moss testified that she had transmitted coded messages but had never been in the code room and could not decipher the messages she sent. She also denied any affiliation with the Communist party. The possibility of mistaken identity arose, because there had apparently been three persons in the Washington area in 1943 named Annie Lee Moss. Mrs. Moss proved to be a sympathetic witness, and McCarthy's ploy backfired. Nothing further came of the charges against Mrs. Moss.[18]

The last witnesses in the Fort Monmouth inquiry appeared before the subcommittee on 11 March 1954. While the existence of a spy ring at the post had not been proven, the Army felt that its integrity had been threatened by McCarthy's charges of rampant Communist subversion by its personnel. With the backing of President Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson decided that the time had come to counterattack.[19]

In an effort to discredit McCarthy, the Army issued a report in which it claimed that the senator and Roy Cohn had sought special privileges for Pvt. G. David Schine, a former subcommittee aide who had recently been drafted into the Army. Schine also happened to be the son of a multimillionaire. The Army contended that McCarthy and Cohn had sought to persuade Secretary Stevens to reassign Schine from Fort Dix, New Jersey, where he was undergoing basic training, to New York City, where he could again work for the subcommittee. In exchange for this favor, McCarthy had allegedly promised that he would either limit or terminate the investigation into Fort Monmouth.[20] Senator McCarthy countered that the Army, for its part, had punished Schine for his connection with the subcommittee. The senator also accused the Army of using Schine as a "hostage" to pressure him to stop the exposure of Communists in the armed forces.[21] In other words, McCarthy accused the Army of trying to use Schine to blackmail him.

To air the charges and countercharges, McCarthy's subcommittee began a second round of hearings in April 1954. These televised proceedings, known as the Army-McCarthy hearings, captured the nation's attention during their three-month duration. As televised hearings were a novelty at that time, daily audiences of up to twenty million tuned in to view the dramatic events as they unfolded.[22] Because of his direct role in the dispute, McCarthy stepped down as chairman, and Senator Mundt presided in his place. McCarthy's seat on the subcommittee was taken by Senator Henry

Dworshak of Idaho. For this confrontation the Democratic members of the subcommittee joined their Republican colleagues in attendance.

The ensuing contest pitted McCarthy and Cohn against Secretary of the Army Stevens and Joseph N. Welch, the Army's special counsel. Despite his considerable efforts to cooperate with the subcommittee, Stevens fared badly as a witness under McCarthy's examination. Behaving like a prosecuting attorney, the senator badgered the mild-mannered Stevens to the point that he became physically ill.[23] It soon became clear that Stevens had in fact granted special favors to Private Schine. While he did not agree to let Schine waive basic training, Stevens had excused him from KP duty and granted him generous leave privileges. Nevertheless through many days of grueling testimony, Stevens never lost his temper. He came across as an honest, if somewhat naïve, man and won the public's sympathy.[24] McCarthy made the opposite impression. When not grilling witnesses, he constantly interrupted the proceedings with "points of order."

Welch's skillful questioning of McCarthy also helped reveal the senator's true colors. In contrast to the intense, energetic McCarthy, the elderly Welch seemed almost somnolent. One participant described him as looking like a "large, round penguin."[25] But looks can be deceiving, and Welch proved to be McCarthy's match in both showmanship and shrewdness. He artfully demonstrated McCarthy's careless regard for the truth by proving that the senator had used phony documents and doctored photographs as "evidence" against the Army. Welch showed, for example, that McCarthy had doctored the 1951 letter, taken from the FBI's files, by which J. Edgar Hoover had alerted Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling, the head of Army intelligence, about possible espionage at Fort Monmouth. At one point, in utter exasperation with McCarthy's attempts to smear the character of a colleague in Welch's law firm, Welch exclaimed, "Have you left no sense of decency?" To many in the audience, the answer had become obvious.[26]

Meanwhile, President Eisenhower, who had initially distanced himself from the hearings, now urged that they be concluded quickly. Employing a nice touch of irony, Eisenhower stated in a news conference on 5 May 1954 that he hoped the United States would gain something from the hearings comparable to what they had cost the nation in self-respect at home and prestige abroad. In a subsequent press conference, the president declared in response to a question about the hearings, "Let's get the facts out and then let's go on about the important business of this Government; and I personally feel, ladies and gentlemen, there is no time to waste."[27]

Eisenhower's sense of urgency did not prevail, and the hearings dragged on for another month. John G. Adams, one of the Army's lawyers, testified that Roy Cohn had threatened to "wreck the Army" if Secretary Stevens did not prevent Schine from being assigned overseas.[28] Both McCarthy and Cohn denied seeking favors for Schine, but evidence indicated otherwise. After seventy-one sessions and two million words of testimony, the Army-McCarthy hearings finally concluded on 17 June 1954, having generated much more heat than light.[29] No substantive findings emerged, and no indictments resulted. The hearings' main accomplishment had been to expose McCarthy's ruthless tactics to a nationwide audience.

In the end, McCarthy had hurt himself most of all. On television he had appeared vindictive and bullying. Moreover, his strident attacks on the Eisenhower administration had eroded his support among Republicans.[30] Despite his popularity with voters, McCarthy had never ingratiated himself with his colleagues in the Senate, where he had been anything but a team player. Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont, a fellow Republican, introduced a resolution of censure against McCarthy. It was referred to a select committee, which held yet another round of hearings, albeit this time without radio and television coverage.[31]

On 27 September 1954, the bipartisan select committee[32] issued its report, which recommended the senator's censure on two counts.[33] One of these was his harsh treatment of Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker, commander of Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. The recipient of a Silver Star and three Bronze Stars for his World War II service in Europe, Zwicker had testified before McCarthy's subcommittee in February 1954. During the course of his questioning, the senator became infuriated with Zwicker over his role in the approval of an honorable discharge for a medical officer who had invoked the Fifth Amendment during an appearance before McCarthy's subcommittee. McCarthy accused Zwicker of protecting Communists within his com-

mand and berated the general as unfit to wear the uniform.[34] The Senate investigators found no provocation on Zwicker's part and cited McCarthy's behavior as reprehensible. The second count against McCarthy was his contempt of the Senate, and this was the transgression that proved to be his downfall.

The Senate deferred action on the committee's recommendation until after the November elections. Then, following nearly a month of debate, the Senate on 2 December approved the censure resolution. By the decisive margin of 67 to 22, the Senate voted to condemn McCarthy for behavior that was contrary to senatorial traditions and ethics.[35] Although the charge regarding General Zwicker was dropped, the Army had played a critical role in dealing McCarthy this serious political setback. As a result of the Senate's action, McCarthy's influence plummeted, and his stranglehold on the nation's psyche was finally broken.

By the time of the censure vote, the national wave of anticommunism had begun to subside. The death of Stalin in March 1953 raised hopes that relations with the Soviet Union might improve, and the end of the Korean War three months later contributed to an easing of international tensions. On the other hand, the fall of Dien Bien Phu to the Vietnamese Communists in May 1954, while the Army-McCarthy hearings were in progress, provided a harbinger of events to come.

McCarthy's censure precipitated a rapid decline in both his personal and professional life. Although still a member of the Senate, he lost his committee chairmanship when the Democrats took control of Congress after the November congressional elections. No longer making national headlines, he found that the press now virtually ignored him. Along with the loss of his political power came a serious deterioration in his health. McCarthy had long been a heavy drinker, and the effects of alcoholism, coupled with other physical ailments, led to his death in May 1957 at the age of forty-eight.[36]

Besides his own career, McCarthy's probe affected the lives of all those touched by it, albeit in a variety of ways. General Lawton, perhaps worn down by the prolonged investigation into Fort Monmouth, retired from the Army on 31 August 1954 at the age of fifty-nine, three years before he reached the mandatory retirement age. McCarthy charged that Secretary Stevens had tried to force Lawton to retire, but Lawton had in fact applied for medical disability retirement. Secretary Stevens, for his part, stepped down from his post in July 1955 and returned to the J. P. Stevens Company. General Zwicker, however, remained in the Army until 1960, winning a promotion to major general despite the opposition of McCarthy and one other senator.[37]

Most of the civil service employees whose lives had been turned upside down by their clashes with McCarthy were eventually able to clear their names. Of the forty-two employees suspended at Monmouth, all but two were later reinstated.[38] They still had to live, however, with the trauma of the experience and the stigma of having been tarred by McCarthy's brush. Aaron Coleman did not regain his federal employment rights until 1958. He eventually returned to his old job at Fort Monmouth and retired from government service in 1978.[39] Some of the other principals, however, seem to have benefited from their notoriety. Roy Cohn pursued a successful career as a lawyer in New York City. G. David Schine served out his Army hitch, returned to private life, and married a former Miss Universe. He later produced the movie *The French Connection*. Hollywood also beckoned Joseph Welch, who appeared as the trial judge in the movie *Anatomy of a Murder*.[40]

McCarthy's own moment in the spotlight was relatively brief, but his name remains closely associated with the Cold War era. The threat of Communist infiltration into the government was indeed real, as the Hiss and Rosenberg convictions had clearly demonstrated, but McCarthy's methods gave anticommunism a bad name. Even granting the sincerity of McCarthy's desire to root out subversives, his trampling of civil rights and due process threatened the very freedoms he professed to be protecting.

Ironically, however, McCarthy's allegations about spies in the Signal Corps have turned out to be more valid than he could demonstrate in the 1950s. Two Fort Monmouth scientists, Joel Barr and Al Sarant, fled to the Soviet Union following the Rosenbergs' arrest. Given new identities by the KGB, Barr and Sarant used their technical knowledge on Soviet defense projects, including the development of a radar-controlled antiaircraft gun. They later set up a microelectronics laboratory in Leningrad and became pioneers in the Russian computer industry. Although the

FBI has never been able to prove the existence of a Rosenberg spy ring at Fort Monmouth, these men appear to have been the "missing link" that McCarthy was looking for between the Fort Monmouth laboratories and the Soviet Union.[41]

The final chapters of this story have yet to be written. Documents held by the National Security Agency and Russian state archives may still bring important new information to light. The emerging evidence indicates that, for all his faults, Senator Joseph McCarthy was probably closer to the truth about Communists in our government than we would like to believe.[42] The Cold War may be over, but its controversies live on.

NOTES

1. War Department General Staff, "Strength of the Army, 1 October 1944," p. 16, and "Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer, 1946," p. 349, both in U.S. Army Center of Military History Library.

2. "Annual Report of the Chief Signal Officer, 1946," pp. 455–57.

3. Historical Office, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, *A Concise History of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey* (Fort Monmouth, N.J., 1985), pp. 28, 35; Michael Straight, *Trial by Television* (Boston, 1954), p. 65.

4. William B. Ewald, Jr., *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* (New York, 1984), pp. 20–25.

5. Thomas C. Reeves, *The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A Biography* (New York, 1982), p. 516; John G. Adams, *Without Precedent: The Story of the Death of McCarthyism* (New York, 1983), pp. 64–65.

6. Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, p. 518.

7. Ibid., pp. 516–17.

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, *Army Signal Corps—Subversion and Espionage, Hearings*, 83d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1953–54, (hereafter cited as *Signal Corps Hearings*), p. 54.

9. Ibid. Coleman's public testimony appears on pp. 51–56, 62, and 77–113. He had previously testified in executive sessions. See also the *New York Times*, 12 Jan 54, p. 12; Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* pp. 91–93, 99; and Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, p. 521.

10. Charles E. Potter, *Days of Shame* (New York, 1965), p. 37; Adams, *Without Precedent*, p. 49; Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* pp. 90–91.

11. Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* p. 130. Back appeared before the subcommittee in executive session but never in a public hearing. He also attended the Army-McCarthy hearings but was not called upon to testify. See the *Quadrennial Report of the Chief Signal Officer, 1951-1955* (Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 115.

12. Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* p. 130.

13. *Signal Corps Hearings*, pp. 13–18. Lotz subsequently served as chief of communications-electronics and commander of the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command.

14. Ibid., pp. 19–21.

15. Ibid., pp. 116–24.

16. Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, p. 520.

17. *New York Times*, 14 Jan 54. The three-part series, by reporter Peter Kihss, appeared in the *Times* on 11, 12, and 13 January 54.

18. *Signal Corps Hearings*, pp. 310–29, 340–52, and 443–62; Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, pp. 548–50, 568–69; and Potter, *Days of Shame*, pp. 107–08.

19. Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, pp. 566–67.

20. Straight, *Trial by Television*, p. 32.

21. Ibid., pp. 33–34.

22. Robert Griffith, "McCarthy, Joseph Raymond," *Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Six* (New York, 1980), p. 405.

23. Straight, *Trial by Television*, p. 81; Adams, *Without Precedent*, pp. 168–75, 178–85.

24. Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* pp. 346–47.

25. Adams, *Without Precedent*, p. 164.

26. Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* pp. 337–39; Adams, *Without Precedent*, pp. 178–83, 226–29; and Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, p. 631.

27. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 452–53, 496, with the quotation on p. 496.

28. Ewald, *Who Killed Joe McCarthy?* p. 348.

29. Ibid., p. 380.

30. Robert Griffith, "McCarthy," p. 405.

31. Arthur V. Watkins, *Enough Rope: The Inside Story of the Censure of Senator Joe McCarthy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969). Senator Watkins, a Utah Republican, was chairman of the select committee.

32. Senator Samuel J. Ervin of North Carolina was one

of the Democratic members of this committee. He later chaired the Senate committee that investigated the 1972 Watergate break-in.

33. Watkins, *Enough Rope*, prints the committee's report as an appendix. See also Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, pp. 652–53.

34. Watkins, *Enough Rope*, p. 75 and appendix, pp. 47–61; Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, pp. 542–44.

35. *Congressional Record* 100 (83d Cong., 2d sess.): 16392. See also Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York, 1990), p. 141. The censure resolution is printed in Watkins, *Enough Rope*, p. 150.

36. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, pp. 141–42; Reeves, *Life and Times of McCarthy*, pp. 665–72.

37. Adams, *Without Precedent*, p. 172; *Washington Post*, 11 Aug 91, p. B6.

38. Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, p. 137.

39. Adams, *Without Precedent*, p. 262.

40. Ibid., pp. 263–64.

41. ABC News, "Nightline," 15 Jun 92. David Greenglass named Joel Barr in the deposition he gave the subcommittee in 1953. See *Signal Corps Hearings*, pp. 143–47.

42. Nicholas von Hoffman, "Was McCarthy Right About the Left?" *Washington Post*, Outlook section, 14 Apr 96.

Mrs. Rebecca R. Raines has been a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History since 1977. She is the author of Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps *(Center of Military History, 1996).*

Cheese

Brooks Kleber

This is a story about a large wheel of green (not aged) Polish goat's milk cheese acquired by two American prisoners of war in German custody on an arduous trek out of Poland in early 1945. First, let's set the scene.

In January 1945 Soviet troops forced the Germans to evacuate the American prisoners from Oflag [*Offizierslager*—Officers' Camp] 64 in Schubin, Poland. We were to go ten kilometers and get a train. But there was no train, so 45 days and over 300 miles later the remnants of that column arrived at a point north of Berlin where it entrained for another POW camp at Hammelburg.

The winter of 1944–45 was bitterly cold. Each day of the 300-mile march, a German guard and an American officer bicycled ahead to find a place for us to sleep and prepare a meager supper. They did their job well. Almost always, the prisoners bedded down in barns, outbuildings, or an occasional church or schoolhouse. Then they received a piece of bread and a bowl of soup.

One night was particularly memorable. I was in a rather small schoolroom with a portrait of Göring looming over my desk. Someone came by and said that a group of Polish émigrés, also moving west, was out back trading wheels of cheese for American cigarettes. The man before me got his wheel for three packs; it cost me five packs, and I understand the POW after me paid ten for his cheese. The cigarettes came from our American Red Cross packages. My buddy, Red O'Connor, contributed half the cigarettes and got half of the cheese.

The wheel was frozen so it took some time to hack it into two parts. We stowed our treasures in the makeshift backpacks we had fashioned out of shirts and Red Cross boxes. Sometimes we made cheese sandwiches with the bread in the middle. We were the envy of our comrades. I can't remember how long our cheese lasted, but I do remember a series of events it prompted.

The first incident involved only me. I must explain that I love dogs and always have had one. My care for my pets included an examination of their stool as a barometer of their health. For the seven months of my captivity, I had adopted the same test for my own well-being. It seemed to work; at least it was reassuring.

A short time after the acquisition of the cheese, while undergoing this time-tested examination, I was horrified to discover a pile of rather small, round

pellets. My immediate reaction was that something had perforated in my digestive system and that my normal elimination was being filtered as through a sieve. Then it dawned on me that goats, like rabbits, produce that type of stool and that the quantity of goat's milk cheese I had been eating not only was providing welcome nutrition but was giving me this goatlike signature. It was disquieting, but I learned to live with it.

And goat's milk cheese *is* nutritional, a fact brought home to me by a lieutenant colonel who had been my barracks commander at Oflag 64. A West Pointer, he had commanded a battalion in combat. He was quite formal, even in prison camp. He occasionally sought out junior officers for a game of chess. "The lessons of the battlefield could be found on the chessboard," he would intone. It was no reflection on him or on my erstwhile profession, but at that time I didn't much give a damn about the lessons of the battlefield.

Late one afternoon, as we were settling down for the night, my chess-playing commander approached me. "Kleber," he began, "if I had my choice of any kind of food I could take on a trip like this, do you know what I'd take?" Well, of course I knew, but I put on an expressionless face and answered, "No, sir." "Cheese," he said, "because of its great nutritional value, its durability, and its relatively small bulk." He went on and on. I don't remember saluting, but I did thank him profusely as I walked away.

The third cheese incident places me in a more generous light. One miserable afternoon we were trudging through large quantities of snow near a small Polish village. I saw a dead horse just off the road whose rump had been carved bare by hungry villagers. I wondered how the horse had died. A fellow prisoner with whom I had become friends—tall, quiet, good-looking John Carlson from Rhinelander, Wisconsin—was just ahead of me. Suddenly he darted off to the side of the road, swept up a dead white chicken, and thrust it under his coat. I also wondered how the chicken had died.

That night circumstances enabled Carlson to pluck, clean, and cook his chicken. A bit later, he came over to me and offered to trade part of his dish, I forget which part, for some of my cheese. While I rejected the trade, I did share with John a generous piece of my cheese.

And that concluded my adventures with one half wheel of green goat's milk cheese, except for one thing. Two months later, after we had arrived at Hammelburg, survived General Patton's abortive escape episode, and spent some time in Nuremberg, we were leisurely making our way south through Bavaria. The war was all but over and the guards were now very friendly, especially the one who went from prisoner to prisoner explaining that he had once worked in the Buffalo post office. On 15 April 1945, I celebrated my twenty-sixth birthday. I cooked some potatoes, without salt, but with a stray carrot. I also made a mess of fresh wild mustard. It was a beautiful meal—white, orange, and green. Then John Carlson appeared. In his hand he had a pack of Lucky Strike cigarettes tied with a sprig of pussy willow. It was my birthday present. He could have used the cigarettes for a significant trade with a German villager.

In all the years afterward, I always remembered John's cigarettes as the most meaningful birthday present I had ever received. In presenting me with my annual gift, my wife always acknowledged this. I tried to contact John Carlson after the war and never succeeded. But he and the cheese and cigarettes are indelibly etched in my book of significant memories.

Dr. Brooks Kleber served with the 90th Infantry Division in France in World War II and was captured by the Germans on the Cotentin Peninsula. After the war, he was a historian with the Chemical Corps and coauthor of The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat *(Center of Military History, 1966), chief historian of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, and assistant chief of military history at CMH.*

Editor's Journal

The editor thanks his colleague Mary Haynes for her assistance in obtaining illustrations to accompany Kenneth Templeton's account of the last days of Col. William O. Darby. Ms. Haynes selected photos from the 10th Mountain Division's papers in the Western History Collection of the Denver Public Library.

Charles Hendricks

Liberation Monument Dedicated at Caumont, France

On 11 November 1997, American and French veterans gathered outside St. Martin's Church in Caumont, France, for the unveiling of a monument to the liberation of that town in 1944 by the American 1st Infantry Division. Located in Normandy about six miles east of St. Lô, Caumont was at the southeastern corner of the area liberated by American troops in the ten days following the landing at OMAHA Beach.

Jean-Jacques Viart, mayor of Caumont; Lt. Col. Jean-Pierre Manley, assistant Army attaché at the U.S. defense attaché's office in Paris; and Maj. Michael McManus of Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, joined in unveiling the monument. The English-language portion of the plaque's bilingual inscription reads as follows:

On June 13, 1944, Caumont was liberated by the 1st Infantry Division of the United States Army. Starting from the smallest of footholds seized on D-day, June 6, the division attacked inland some 23 miles from OMAHA Beach and captured the strategic high ground around Caumont.

The successful defense of this important sector of the Allied beachhead permitted the buildup of men, equipment and supplies required for the Allied breakout operation of late July. That massive offensive liberated France and Belgium and reached the borders of Germany by mid-September 1944.

After the ceremony Colonel Manley and Major McManus visited the Caumont home of Guillaume Mercader, an officially recognized Hero of the French Resistance who had provided to the Allies intelligence on German dispositions prior to the Normandy landings. Mercader had earlier attended the unveiling ceremony.

Retired Maj. Gen. Albert H. Smith, Jr., organized the effort to present the division's monument to Caumont. As a captain, Smith had been executive officer of the 1st Infantry Division's 16th Infantry regiment during the Normandy campaign, In 1968–69 Smith served as deputy commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam. General Smith was unable to attend the unveiling ceremony, but Major McManus read the following remarks on his behalf:

Ladies and gentlemen,

What a great day this is! What a perfect time to dedicate a liberation memorial!

My one regret is not being with you for this ceremony. However, I am present in spirit as two very good friends pass along my remarks.

The younger soldier, Maj. Mike McManus, will read the English text; and our division veteran from Brussels, Mr. Jean Centner, will translate.

Now, let's start at the beginning. How did all of this come about?

The concept of a memorial came to me in a dream last December. After consulting with several World War II buddies, we agreed the project had merit.

The rest was simple: design the memorial, raise the money, and obtain a *green light* from Mayor Viart and his municipal council.

Our project goals never changed:

1. Construct and present to Caumont a beautiful memorial of its liberation.
2. Permanently recognize a major achievement of the 1st Infantry Division during the Normandy campaign.
3. Remind French citizens, especially Normans, how much American veterans of World War II cherish their friendship.

Today's French-American ceremony marks the successful achievement of these goals. It is a memorable climax to a noble joint endeavor on both sides of the Atlantic.

My wife and I devoted hundreds of hours to make our dream come true. However, we needed a comparable effort from Phil Rivers in Normandy and Jean Centner in Brussels to present what you see before you this Armistice Day.

Our First Division Museum, located near Chicago, Illinois, has sent along two special handouts for attendees. One salutes this dedication. The other souvenir is a reminder to visit our 1st Infantry Division monument overlooking OMAHA Beach and reflect on D-day, 6 June 1944. Please take these handouts home for your family members and friends to see.

What about the cost of this memorial? Who paid

Ceremonies marking the unveiling of the 1st Infantry Division's Liberation Monument in Caumont, France 11 November 1997 (Photo courtesy of Maj. Gen. Albert H. Smith, Jr., Ret.)

the bills? These are good questions.

However, before giving you any numbers, I should emphasize this endeavor was a labor of love from start to finish. The unfailing and continuous support of my wife and friends, especially Jean Centner and Phil Rivers, could not be purchased. The warm reception of the idea by Mayor Viart and his municipal council was absolutely essential. In short, the liberation memorial would not have happened without the invaluable, unpaid work of these dedicated participants.

With this explanation, I can report that half of the money needed to complete the project was contributed by division veterans we were able to contact. The remaining half was provided by my wife and myself.

A Final Question: What enduring and meaningful remembrances should we take with us from today's ceremonies?

First, soldiers of the United States have, in this century, twice joined their French comrades-in-arms to defeat a common enemy in Europe.

Second, during World War II, German forces occupied France until 6 June 1944 when Allied forces stormed the beaches and landing areas of Normandy to liberate their freedom-loving friends.

Third, that our 1st Infantry Division, the oldest and most famous American division, suffered 1,744 casualties from its successful D-day assault on OMAHA Beach until the liberation of Caumont on 13 July 1944.

Fourth, that an outstanding leader of World War I, Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commanded the division in this and subsequent battles until France and Belgium were liberated during World War II.

Fifth and finally, this is the day to remember that soldiers of democracy win battles for freedom. They often give their lives in the fighting.

Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes my talk, except to thank you for attending today's ceremonies. Be assured you have my every best wish for the future.

The Influence of Warfare in Colonial America On the Development of British Light Infantry

By Jack E. Owen, Jr.

The following article is an edited and abridged version of a more extensively annotated paper that includes an appendix and bibliography. Interested readers may request a copy of the original paper from the Managing Editor.

The light infantryman was a principal product of the momentous changes in European military thought and tactics that occurred in the latter half of the eighteenth century. A resourceful, mobile sharpshooter, the versatile light infantryman was the predecessor of the modern-day soldier. Operating independently or as part of a small group on the battlefield, the light infantryman was encouraged to exercise individual initiative in combat, and he was trained to combine firepower with movement on the field of battle.[1] The development and appearance of substantial numbers of light troops in European armies during the late eighteenth century altered the tactical balance of land warfare and the nature of campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars. However, not all of the influences on the evolution of light infantry forces originated on the European continent.

A number of historians have persuasively argued that the introduction of European military technology, organization, and tactics into countries of the non-Western world prior to the twentieth century drove those countries to adopt European administrative, economic, and cultural forms and institutions.[2] Less often remarked upon, however, are the ways in which European and European-style military forces, tactics, and modes of warfare were themselves influenced and changed by their encounters with non-Western opponents and cultures.

This article will first briefly review the development of light infantry in Europe before 1750. It will examine the military technology, techniques, and institutions of North American colonial warfare that evolved in response to Indian tactics and methods of warfare. It will then describe the emergence of a unique and distinctly American light infantry formation—the rangers—organized to conduct reconnaissance and raiding operations deep in enemy territory. Finally, it will draw some conclusions about the influence of wilderness warfare on British military organization, training, tactics, and operations into the nineteenth century. The article will attempt to define the essential characteristics of the light infantryman and to highlight the organizational forces and influences which operated to encourage or obstruct the adoption of light infantry formations and tactics in the British Army of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It will also suggest an important connection between the British military experience in colonial America and the development of light infantry in the British Army.[3]

The Development of Light Infantry in Europe

During the Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), notably at the battles of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, the longbow-armed infantryman dethroned the armored knight/cavalryman as the dominant force in battle and, along with the pikeman, reestablished the primacy of infantry in combat.[4] Over the next three centuries, the development of firearms gave further emphasis and centrality to the combat role of infantry. By the eighteenth century, the predominant tactical problem for a European army commander was the effective employment of the standard infantry weapon of the day—the smoothbore, flintlock musket, a generally inaccurate firearm with a short range and a slow rate of fire. This was best achieved by linear battle formations, which brought to bear the most weapons and produced the greatest volume of fire.[5] Controlled volley fire delivered by regular infantrymen drawn up in precise, shoulder-to-shoulder line formations required strict discipline and unquestioning obedience from the troops. The actions of the rank and file were rigidly regulated and thoroughly constrained. The exercise of initiative was stifled. These tactics, although widely employed, be-

came known as "Frederician" after King Frederick the Great of Prussia (1740–86), their foremost practitioner in the eighteenth century.[6]

The development of firearms and the evolution of Frederician tactics also encouraged the employment of light infantry in a meaningful battlefield role. Although the Swiss and Spanish of the sixteenth century used arquebusiers and musketeers as adjunct members of their pike formations, the first European military power to recognize the full potential of light infantry was Austria. Early in the eighteenth century the Austrians employed bands of irregular sharpshooters against the Turks to perform outpost, reconnaissance, and security duties and to protect line infantry from Turkish marksmen. The first large-scale appearance of light troops in Europe occurred during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48).[7]

Beginning in 1710, the British raised independent companies of Scottish Highlanders, and by 1739 they organized these companies into the 43d Regiment of the line, which later became the 42d Royal Highlanders. Less heavily armed and outfitted than regular troops, the Highlanders could move swiftly through the rugged terrain of Scotland. They were the first light infantry troops in the British Army.[8]

French Marshal Maurice de Saxe was a strong advocate of employing light infantry as skirmishers ahead of line infantry attack columns, sharpshooting at enemy formations and preparing the way for the attack.[9] In 1744 Saxe raised Grassin's Legion, which consisted of 600 light infantrymen and 300 light cavalry. The British encountered Grassin's Legion in Flanders in 1745 at Fontenoy, where that unit vigorously and successfully defended rough terrain, woods, and prepared enclosures against British attacks.[10]

In the same year that Grassin's Legion was formed, the Prussians organized their skirmishers into companies of jaegers. Frederick the Great did not favor light troops, whose tactical employment of cover, concealment, and sharpshooting was not "brave" by the king's standards. Frederick was also concerned about the notion of arming and training a common soldier to—among other things—target and kill officers and nobles on the battlefield. The Prussian ruler believed it was dangerous to encourage or direct lower class violence against any member of the upper class, even that of the enemy. Nevertheless Frederick was forced to augment his jaegers during the Seven Years' War to deal with increasing numbers of Austrian and French light troops.[11]

The Jacobite Rebellion in Scotland (1745–46) forced the British Army to fight tenacious Jacobite Highlanders in their own mountainous territory. Several of the British officers who served in Scotland later fought in America.[12] Thanks to the European use and development of light infantry forces, the British had a certain familiarity with the employment of light infantry in European-style warfare before the outbreak of the French and Indian War in the American colonies.[13] As the British were to learn, however, the lessons of European warfare were not directly applicable to fighting in the American wilderness.

The Adaptation of European Military Tactics in Colonial America

Violence and war have been two of the most pervasive phenomena in American history. More than one-third of the 156 years from the founding of Jamestown in 1607 to the end of the French and Indian War in 1763 witnessed warfare somewhere in the colonies.[14] While it is clear that American colonial military organizations and methods of warfare were patterned primarily on European (i.e., British) military thought, tactics, and techniques, it is equally certain that the uniqueness of the American situation, with a vast expanse of territory inhabited by an elusive, capable, and culturally distinct Native American enemy, demanded modifications to the European model.[15]

Early American colonists began fighting Indians almost immediately, and, although the settlers were militarily inept when compared to European professionals, survival in the colonies demanded that every settler develop soldiering skills. Indian tactics were based upon surprise attack and ambush. As summarized by Col. Henri Bouquet, a Swiss mercenary who served with the British Army in America in the mid-eighteenth century, the Indians' method of fighting was distinguished by the fact that they "surround their enemy . . . they fight scattered, and never in a compact body . . . [and] they never stand their ground when attacked, but immediately give way, to return to the charge."[16] The colonists gradually began to realize that, in the tactical environment of the American frontier, the Indian, not the British colonist, was the mili-

tary "professional."

Important cultural traditions influenced Indian tactics of warfare against the colonists. Native communities measured a warrior's success not only by his bravery but also by his ability to seize prisoners and bring them home alive for adoption or execution. None of the benefits that European combatants sought from war—territorial expansion, economic gain, and plunder of the defeated—outranked the seizure of prisoners in the view of Indian warriors. The same factors that made captives so central to warfare produced strong sanctions against the loss of Indian lives in battle. A war party that suffered even a few casualties could be expected to retreat, because casualties subverted the goal of replacing the dead with captives. Efforts to minimize fatalities underlay several Indian tactics which contemporary Europeans considered cowardly: their fondness for ambushes and surprise attacks, their unwillingness to fight when outnumbered, and their avoidance of frontal assaults on heavily fortified places.[17] Cultural differences aside, however, the settlers recognized that the only way to defeat the Indians was to adopt similar guerrilla tactics while maintaining the advantage of technological superiority that firearms provided.[18]

For their part, many Indians quickly perceived the value of muskets for both hunting and fighting. Despite colonial laws forbidding the trade of weapons to the Indians, French, Dutch, and English traders commonly pursued this commerce.[19] By the early years of the eighteenth century, most Indian tribes in colonial America had acquired firearms.[20] Although their ability to maintain and repair weapons was minimal and their capacity to manufacture gunpowder almost nonexistent,[21] the Indians became reasonably proficient with firearms,[22] and they seem to have been able to acquire adequate supplies of arms and ammunition from various European allies. Thus, the initial technological superiority of the colonists was largely neutralized.

Because the colonists generally lived and worked in fixed locations—farms, cabins, and blockhouses or forts—their military posture fundamentally involved the defense of static positions against a mobile attacker who could choose the time and place of his assaults. Every isolated cabin or farm was a vulnerable target, impossible to defend completely against surprise attack. Forts and blockhouses provided some refuge for settlers, but these were too few and far between to deter Indian raids effectively, even when garrisoned by troops or militia forces. Indian war parties moved swiftly, struck unexpectedly, enhanced the impact of their operations by using terrifying brutality, and then disappeared into the forest before they could be counterattacked. This type of warfare successfully immobilized much larger forces of colonial militia preoccupied with defending their settlements.[23]

The colonists soon concluded that it was necessary to take the fight to the enemy in the heart of the wilderness where his villages, fields, and families were located. To do so, the settlers had to add an offensive component to their Indian warfare strategy.[24] This offensive component was pursued actively by the British regular troops who came to the colonies in increased numbers in the mid-eighteenth century to protect British settlers against the incursions of the French and their Indian allies. However, the defeat of Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock and his 1,500 troops at the Monongahela River in Pennsylvania on 9 June 1755 by a smaller force of French, Canadians, and Indians made clear the difficulty of attempting to fight Indians in the wilderness with European troops and Frederician tactics.

The French and Canadian Military Experience in North America

The nature of warfare in North America changed as the Anglo-French contest for dominance developed. By the early eighteenth century the population of the British colonies of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire numbered about eight times that of French Canada. Given this gross disparity of manpower, the French strategy in North America could never be more than a holding action, relying on France to salvage matters with military victory in Europe or favorable peace negotiations.[25]

Nonetheless, the French, the Canadians, and their Indian allies counted many more men who were adept at frontier warfare than did the British colonists. At least through 1757, therefore, the French and their Indians allies maintained the upper hand in the spasmodic warfare of the North American woodlands.[26] The French were also aided by the arrival at Quebec in 1755 of General Ludwig August Dieskau, a German

baron in French service, and 2,000 French regulars—France's answer to the Braddock expedition.[27] Dieskau had considerable experience with irregular warfare in Europe, and he instantly adopted guerrilla warfare tactics that were appropriate to America's forested terrain. With a force of 220 French regulars, 600 Canadian militia, and 700 Indians, Dieskau ambushed 1,000 British colonial militiamen and Indian allies near Lake George on 8 September 1755. The British colonists were routed, although Dieskau was also wounded and captured in an abortive frontal attack on the colonials' fortified camp later that day.[28] Dieskau demonstrated that the French were comfortable with the employment of woodland tactics and techniques of warfare, but his failed assault on the fortified camp displayed the difficulties of imposing a European style of warfare on Indians and colonial troops. Faced with much larger British and American forces, the French were committed, of necessity, to guerrilla warfare in North America.

The French officers who served in Canada during the French and Indian War found that Canadian soldiers were willing to perform military service and were skilled in Indian methods of irregular warfare. Although courageous, the Canadians were undisciplined. Along with Indian tactics, they had adopted such Indian attitudes toward war as the notions that victory involved inflicting losses on the enemy without suffering any in return and that the campaigning season was over when any victory, however insubstantial, had been achieved and honor gratified.[29] The Canadians fought well as skirmishers and on raiding expeditions against the American colonists, but they were a liability when incorporated and assimilated directly into regular line infantry units. Indeed, at the decisive Battle of Quebec on 13 September 1759, many Canadians suddenly deserted their regular line infantry units in the midst of the battle. They retired to the flanking woods, where they joined other Canadian militia and Indians, leaving the French regulars on the battlefield in disarray.[30]

By 1760 the French had organized the Canadian militia into separate companies to be deployed as skirmishers in front of the regular troops. No longer irregular sharpshooters roaming on the edges of the battlefield, the Canadians became light infantrymen whose efforts were coordinated with and supported heavy infantry in the decisive attack. Conventional discipline and irregular tactics were thereby combined to transform the Canadian militiaman from a scout and raider to an infantry soldier able to deal with a variety of opponents and battlefield situations—the light infantryman, a type of soldier that was just being incorporated into European armies.[31]

The Formation and Employment of American Rangers, and the British Army's Reaction to Irregular Warfare in North America

During the French and Indian War, the British in America needed a force of experienced woodsmen and marksmen capable of scouting territory, providing security for regular troops on the march, and fighting the French, Canadians, and Indians on their own terms and with their own tactics. The most successful provincial force that the British recruited for these purposes was Rogers' Rangers, commanded by Maj. Robert Rogers of New Hampshire.

The French and Indian War was fought in North America almost entirely in rugged, heavily wooded terrain. This geography and the almost complete absence of roads made cavalry useless. Major Rogers and his companies of hard-bitten frontiersmen assumed the essential missions of reconnaissance and scouting for the British Army. The speed and mobility of Rogers' Rangers, their ability to live and operate independently in the woods, and their knowledge of Indian tactics and habits enabled them to become the "eyes and ears" of the British Army.[32]

A secondary mission of Rogers' Rangers was to conduct raids against the enemy. Rogers aggressively carried the war to the French and Indian forces deep in their own territory. In an era in which active warfare was limited almost exclusively to warm-weather months, Rogers' Rangers fought year round. Their most remarkable exploit was their raid in 1759 on St. Francis, an Indian village on the St. Lawrence River. The St. Francis Indians were intensely loyal to the French. In countless attacks on British colonists, they had killed and tortured hundreds of men, women, and children. Rogers had long desired to strike a blow against the Indians' main village, and Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Amherst, the British Army commander, approved such a raid in the fall of 1759. After moving 150 miles by boat and foot through uncharted wilderness in

cold October weather, Rogers and approximately 140 rangers successfully executed a surprise attack on the village, killing at least 200 Indians, including women and children, at the cost of only 7 rangers wounded.

As chance would have it, a party of several hundred French and Indians was located about four miles away near another Indian settlement, and this force immediately began a pursuit of Rogers' Rangers. As the rangers returned south, they had no time for hunting, and halts for rest were few. The men became physically debilitated from lack of food and from constant exposure to freezing rain and cold north winds. On the long trek to friendly territory, forty-nine rangers were killed or captured by the French and Indians or were left behind when they could no longer keep up. Nonetheless, the raid of Rogers' Rangers on the Indian village at St. Francis was a bold offensive stroke that was widely hailed by the colonists in New England. It was a signal to the French and their Indian allies that nowhere could they consider themselves safe, and it demonstrated both a new aggressiveness by the British colonists and a significant departure from their previously defensive Indian warfare strategy.[33]

British military leaders viewed the skills and tactics of Rogers' Rangers as so well suited to frontier combat that they asked Rogers to write down his rules and tactical principles for the use and training of British light infantry forces in America. Rogers responded with what may well have been the first manual of warfare written in the New World.[34] Rogers' *Rules or Plan of Discipline* is a remarkable handbook of irregular warfare techniques, many of which bear a striking resemblance to modern small unit tactics.[35] It is apparent from this document that Rogers had a clear and intuitive understanding of successful light infantry and irregular warfare operations. Readily derivable from the *Rules or Plan of Discipline* are certain of the major characteristics of light infantry: mobility and speed to, from, and on the battlefield; a heavy reliance on small-unit leadership and individual initiative; stress on marksmanship and the ability to bring accurate fire quickly to bear on an enemy; the use of cover and concealment, with an emphasis on surprising the enemy and avoiding being surprised; and a steadily expanding battlefield role, evolving from skirmishing and the defense of regular forces to offensive roles, including raiding, reconnaissance, and pursuit missions.

In the mid-eighteenth century, however, the British, like other Europeans, were accustomed to view the light infantry's value as limited to skirmishing, scouting, and security in support of line infantry formations. Even during and after its North American experience in the French and Indian War, the British Army only very gradually began to realize that light troops might also have a distinct offensive function on the battlefield.[36] While the British learned certain lessons from Braddock's defeat and from the successes of Rogers' Rangers,[37] they neither reduced their emphasis on rigid discipline nor abandoned regular line of battle tactics, even in the American backwoods. They adapted and modified their military tactics and techniques to the French and Indian enemy and to the forested terrain, but this response to the uniqueness of warfare in America constituted neither the British Army's conversion to light infantry tactics nor an acceptance of independent action on the battlefield by small groups of soldiers. Indeed, at the end of the French and Indian War in 1763, the British drastically reduced their light infantry formations. From the postwar British point of view, this made eminent sense. After all, the war in North America had finally been decided by a clash of regular French and British Army units on the Plains of Abraham, not by rangers or light infantry. This reinforced the conventional European view of light infantry as supporting troops only, incapable of producing a decisive military outcome. British military leaders could thus conclude that the Europeans had come to America and imposed their kind of warfare on the wilderness.[38]

After the Treaty of Paris, the British hardly envisioned that their troops would soon again be fighting against irregular, guerrilla forces in a colonial wilderness. Instead they focused their attention and training on their most likely and most threatening foe, another European army committed to Frederician warfare and line of battle tactics. Nevertheless over the course of the next decade, with war once again looming in North America, Maj. Gen. William Howe attempted to recreate the British light infantry forces which had served in America during the French and Indian War. British light infantry, dragoons, and light cavalry appeared in ever-greater numbers during the course of the War of American Independence.

Among the British light troops which excelled in irregular fighting during that war were the Queen's Rangers, raised in 1776 by none other than Major Rogers. Fighting in the southern colonies under the command of Col. John Simcoe, the Queen's Rangers gained a reputation as one of the most efficient fighting units on either side during the independence struggle.[39] The Hessian jaegers, another light infantry formation serving with the British Army in America, produced an important future exponent of light infantry doctrine. Capt. Johann von Ewald served as a jaeger officer throughout the War of American Independence. A prolific commentator on that war and on the tactics he observed there, Ewald saw his 1790 book on light infantry translated into English in 1803 as *A Treatise Upon the Duties of Light Troops*. That book would significantly influence British light infantry training in the Napoleonic Wars.[40]

Overall, however, light infantry forces constituted only a minor part of the British military effort in the War of American Independence. Concentrating on an effort to force a general engagement with Washington's main army, which the American commander repeatedly avoided, British military leaders never improvised sufficiently to overcome one of the strengths of their American opposition—the irregular bodies of American marksmen whose light infantry tactics, dispersed and individualistic, prevented regular infantry operating in line formations from effectively engaging or defeating them.[41]

Nonetheless, by the time they returned from this second major American conflict, many British officers, including such high-ranking leaders as Maj. Gen. Charles Cornwallis, had become firmly persuaded of the value of accurate, intelligently applied firepower on the battlefield and the usefulness of light troops.[42] While Frederician tactics had lost much allure for those officers who had experienced irregular warfare in America, the changing tactical philosophies of these officers won little approval from those of their colleagues who had not seen similar service in America. Thus, the British Army's modest tactical innovations during the War of American Independence again gave way to the time-honored drill and close formations of the line infantryman, with change stymied by the British Army's institutional commitment to the traditional European way of war.[43]

General David Dundas and the *Rules and Regulations* for the British Army

At the beginning of the 1790s, the British Army lacked a standardized drill manual for the exercise of its foot troops, and its regiments did not practice battle tactics and movements in any uniform fashion. The British Army's incompetence in battle drill could be traced in part to its campaigning on the American continent between 1756 and 1783. In America, the regiments had learned to fight in a forested countryside with few open fields against enemies with little cavalry or artillery. These conditions encouraged the deployment of British troops in loose, open orders. In place of the traditional three-deep firing line, British officers in America adopted a formation of only two ranks. Maj. Gen. (later General Sir) David Dundas and other British military traditionalists concluded, as they focused their attention on Britain's next military opponent, the army of Revolutionary France, that such battlefield circumstances exaggerated the value of light infantry.[44]

Dundas analyzed what he believed to be the defects of British infantry and developed a comprehensive system of drill and maneuvers to overcome them. He based his system on Frederician principles designed for a style of warfare that America had never seen: the clash of great armies of highly drilled infantry, cavalry, and artillery on the plains of northern Europe. Dundas' system was incorporated in the *Rules and Regulations for the Formations, Field Exercises, and Movements of His Majesty's Forces* issued in 1792. Warmly received by many British soldiers and military theorists, the *Rules and Regulations* provided the British Army with uniform battle tactics that would enable its regiments to come together and act in unison without difficulty. However, the *Rules and Regulations* did draw some criticism. Col. (later General Sir) John Moore and several other senior British Army officers expressed reservations about the reduced role anticipated for the light infantryman.[45]

General Moore and the Light Infantry Training Camp at Shorncliffe

The French Revolution of 1789 produced a nation in arms, with masses of eager, patriotic recruits. Since such soldiers were not easily adapted to the disciplined, close-order formations of Frederician tactics, the revo-

lutionary armies abandoned the disciplined drill of line or column and broke into swarms of attacking skirmishers who would fire and move independently or in small groups. Such tactics required little training and could harness the initiative and zeal of the individual revolutionary soldier. Because battle experience soon demonstrated that horde attacks were hard to control, however, the French shifted to a flexible combination of linear formations, attack columns, and skirmishing. Carefully trained light troops thus became an important part of the French Republican Army.[46] The successes of Napoleon Bonaparte's campaigns, and particularly the superb performance of French light troops in battle, led Lord Cornwallis in 1798 to observe to Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington, regarding the state of the British Army: "The system of David Dundas and the total want of light infantry sit heavy on my mind."[47]

In response to such concerns, the British Army in 1800 created an Experimental Rifle Corps. The following year the corps reorganized as the 95th Regiment. The men of the 95th wore green uniforms with dark buttons for better concealment and, instead of the "Brown Bess" smoothbore musket, they carried the Baker rifle.[48] The Baker rifle was harder to load than the musket, and it needed frequent cleaning. However, its rifled barrel gave it a reasonably accurate range of 300 yards, and this increased range gave the 95th greater freedom and flexibility in skirmishing and in the execution of light infantry tactics.[49]

In 1803 British military leaders ordered the 43d and 52d Regiments, along with the 95th, to Shorncliffe, Kent, for formal training as light infantry. General Moore, who had gained considerable light infantry experience in the Americas, Corsica, and Ireland, was appointed their commander. For the next three years, Moore trained these regiments under rigorous, wartime conditions. While providing tactical training to these troops, Moore emphasized that they must be treated properly.[50] He realized that light infantry soldiers, unlike troops of the line, had to be capable of acting independently. Moore wished to encourage rather than crush the ingenuity and individuality of his troops. He believed men should obey orders and fight not for fear of punishment, but in response to more positive motivations. A soldier's regiment should be his family, where he could expect both discipline and kindness.[51] At Shorncliffe officers treated their men with respect, and this treatment engendered a reciprocal trust and obedience from the soldiers.

While creating an atmosphere of disciplined teamwork among his officers and men, Moore trained them thoroughly in battle skills.[52] He emphasized the combination of firepower and movement on the battlefield and the exercise of individual initiative by all ranks. He also stressed marksmanship, along with the use of natural cover and terrain for concealment. Moore instilled the principles of alertness and the avoidance of surprise in every man's mind, as he prepared his regiments to undertake skirmishing, reconnaissance, and other light infantry missions.[53] Moore's enthusiasm for light infantry was tempered by his acceptance of the contemporary understanding that line infantry would continue to be the predominant force in battle.[54] Consequently, Moore also trained his light infantrymen to be fully capable of serving as line infantry if the situation so demanded.

British Light Infantry at War on the Continent

By 1809, as the Peninsular War against Napoleon in Spain and Portugal gathered momentum, the British Army had, for the first time in its history, a number of permanently established light infantry regiments that had been properly drilled and equipped. General Moore's 43d, 52d, and 95th Regiments, formed into the Light Brigade, served there in the Duke of Wellington's forces. The light regiments acquitted themselves well in numerous engagements, and some of their battalions proved to be among the finest ever created. British light infantry forces played a crucial role in the battlefield actions that secured Wellington an almost unbroken series of victories over the French army on the Iberian peninsula.[55]

The value of the light infantryman to both the British and the French during the Napoleonic Wars illustrates that General Dundas underestimated their potential in a European war. Dundas' faulty assessment apparently derived, at least in part, from his incomplete understanding of European geography and agricultural practices. Most of his active military service had occurred in northern Germany, where the open countryside was perfectly suited for Frederician tactics and drill. But Belgium, where the British and their allies engaged and decisively defeated Napoleon,

was characterized by small fields enclosed by hedges and ditches, dotted with orchards and stands of trees, and traversed by narrow, fenced lanes. Here infantry could not easily deploy in a regular line of battle, and cavalry could not form for the charge. Dundas failed to appreciate how much the challenges posed by the terrain in some parts of Europe resembled those which the British had experienced in America.[56]

The Duke of Wellington's military genius enabled him to draw the best from both Dundas and Moore. No general better appreciated the strength and firepower of line infantry, and no one used these established forces to better effect. Likewise no general employed a higher proportion of light infantry—as high as 20 percent of a division—to protect his line infantry and, when needed, to serve a line infantry function as well.[57] Consequently, it is not surprising that Wellington positioned the experienced, battle-hardened 52[d] Regiment near the center of the battle line at Waterloo on the evening of 18 June 1815, awaiting the onslaught of Napoleon's finest troops, the Imperial Guard. As the French infantrymen marched up the hill and engaged the British First Guards, the decisive moment of the battle was at hand.

Stationed to the right of the First Guards was the 52[d], commanded by Col. John Colborne (later Lord Seaton). Colborne had served in the original Light Brigade and been one of Sir John Moore's finest pupils.[58] Assessing the situation in the absence of orders from the Duke of Wellington or any other superior officer, Colborne on his own initiative moved the 52[d] forward under heavy fire. He then wheeled his regiment to the left in perfect formation so that it faced the flank of the Imperial Guard. With a well-aimed volley, the marksmen of the 52[d] staggered Napoleon's "Immortals," who faltered, broke, and fled as the men of the 52[d] advanced.[59] Realizing that the crucial moment of the battle was upon him, the Duke of Wellington ordered several other regiments forward on the flanks of the 52[d] in a final advance. The French army dissolved, and the Battle of Waterloo was won.

The proximate key to Wellington's victory was the 52[d]. This light infantry regiment had formed for battle and had stood steadfastly under enemy fire for hours with the discipline of a line infantry regiment. Yet at the critical moment of the engagement, true to its light infantry training and spirit, the 52[d] seized the initiative and attacked with resolve to vanquish some of the finest troops of France. The actions of the 52[d] at Waterloo capture the essence of light infantry tactics—independence of thought and action, marksmanship, and the combination of firepower and movement on the battlefield to surprise, perplex, and defeat the enemy. These elements form a tactical philosophy with enduring value.

British Infantry in the Nineteenth Century
The Light Infantry Legacy

After the Battle of Waterloo the nineteenth century British Army was, with the exception of the Crimean War, largely engaged in fighting colonial wars around the globe against adversaries not given to traditional, European-style warfare. Many of the military skills necessary to defeat such enemies were those customarily associated with the light infantryman: mobility, surprise, marksmanship, and the combat of small, independent units. As a result, the roles of light and line infantry in the British Army began to meld and blur. As increased firepower on the battlefield made Frederician tactics prohibitively costly in terms of human lives, the nineteenth century British infantryman evolved into a soldier whose skills, training, and tactics were in many ways reminiscent of his light infantry forebears.

The light infantry legacy bequeathed to the British infantryman of the nineteenth century was the product of years of gradual and sometimes grudging development. The British Army evolved largely in response to the enemies it had to fight and the combat circumstances it encountered. Noteworthy among the British Army's formative experiences was the irregular warfare it observed during the French and Indian War in America, where Rogers' Rangers, a British colonial force, and American Indian forces supporting the French both exposed the British to the sometimes harsh lessons of unconventional light infantry warfare. Although the British Army only gradually applied to its European fighting the lessons it had learned in its American conflicts, military historian J. F. C. Fuller got it right when he observed that the British light infantry "was born in the backwoods of America, [and] its sire and dam were the Redskin and the backwoodsman."[60] The vestiges of that American colonial warfare influence were still evident in the British infantryman more than a century later.

NOTES

1. John Childs, *Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648–1789* (Manchester, England, 1982), p. 116.
2. David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago, 1990); Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, England, 1988); William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, 1982); and Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, England, 1981).
3. Peter Paret, one historian who has considered this issue, concluded that although irregular warfare in America caught the European military imagination, the colonial experience did not shape the development of light infantry in the British Army, or any other European army, in any essential way. As to the British, however, Paret may overstate his point. Based on Paret's own evidence, a case can be made that the development of British light infantry at the end of the eighteenth century was influenced in important ways by the requirements of American frontier warfare, even if other European armies were not so affected. See Paret, "Colonial Experience and European Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 37 (1964): 52–59, and Paret, "The Relationship Between the Revolutionary War and European Military Thought and Practice in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in Don Higginbotham, ed., *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays* (Westport, Conn., 1978), pp. 150–53.
4. C. W. C. Oman, *The Art of War in the Middle Ages*, ed. John H. Beeler (Ithaca, N. Y., 1953), pp. 73–151.
5. Steven Ross, *From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740–1866* (London, 1979), pp. 24–25.
6. David Gates, *The British Light Infantry Arm, c. 1790–1815: Its Creation, Training, and Operational Role* (London, 1987), pp. 10, 140–41.
7. David Chandler, *The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough* (New York, 1976), p. 72, and R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present* (New York, 1986), p. 733.
8. J. F. C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1925), pp. 55, 58.
9. Maurice de Saxe, *Reveries, or Memoirs upon the Art of War* (1757, reprint ed., Westport, Conn., 1971).
10. Chandler, *The Art of War*.
11. Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington, Ind., 1978), p. 20.
12. Peter E. Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 35 (October 1978): 635–40.
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The Background of Napoleonic Warfare (New York, 1957).

47. Fuller, *British Light Infantry*, p. 215.

48. Arthur Bryant, *The Great Duke or the Invincible General* (London, 1971), p. 118.

49. Roger Parkinson, *Moore of Corunna* (London, 1976), p. 125.

50. David W. Davies, *Sir John Moore's Peninsular Campaign, 1808–1809* (The Hague, 1974), p. 13.

51. Parkinson, *Moore of Corunna*, pp. 126–27, and Dupuy and Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History*, p. 734.

52. By the time Shorncliffe training began there were at least two significant light infantry drill manuals available to Moore and his primary training officer, Col. Kenneth Mackenzie: a translation from the German of the manual of Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Francis de Rottenburg, a Polish-born officer in British service, entitled *Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry* (London, 1798) and a manual by General Francis Jarry, a Frenchman who in 1798 became the first commandant of the British Military College at High Wycombe, entitled *Instruction Concerning the Duties of Light Infantry in the Field* (London, 1801). See Gates, *The British Light Infantry Arm*, pp. 95–105, Richard Glover, *Peninsular Preparation*, pp. 128–29, and Mackesy, "What the British Army Learned," pp. 212–13.

53. Bryant, *The Great Duke*, pp. 118–19.

54. Parkinson, *Moore of Corunna*, p. 127.

55. Gates, *The British Light Infantry Arm*, p. 94, and Michael Glover, *Wellington as Military Commander*, pp. 212–13.

56. Gates, *The British Light Infantry Arm*, p. 48; Mackesy, "What the British Army Learned," p. 209; and Richard Glover, *Peninsular Preparation*, p. 124.

57. Michael Glover, *Wellington as Military Commander*, p. 242.

58. Bryant, *The Great Duke*, p. 448.

59. Philip Booth, *The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (The 43rd/52nd Regiment of Foot)* (London, 1971), pp. 55–57, and John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York, 1976), p. 127.

60. Fuller, *British Light Infantry*, p. 240.

Col. Jack E. Owen, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, is a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds a J.D. degree from Harvard Law School and an M.A. in United States history from the University of Texas at Austin. He currently practices real estate law in Austin, Texas, as the managing partner of the law firm Osborne, Lowe, Helman & Smith, L.L.P.

New Army Historical Publications

The Center of Military History has issued *From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe and the Gulf War* by Stephen P. Gehring (CMH Pub 70–56). The author is a historian with U.S. Army, Europe. The book is available from the Government Printing Office (GPO) for $17 ($21.25 outside the United States) under stock number 008-029-00336-8.

The Office of History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has issued a 159-page, illustrated *History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers* (EP 870-1-45). It is available from GPO for $18 ($22.50 outside the United States) under stock number 008-022-00313-4.

Call for Papers

Siena College is organizing a multidisciplinary conference marking the 60th anniversary of the start of World War II to be held at its campus in Albany County, New York, on 3–4 June 1999. This fourteenth annual conference will focus on 1939, but papers covering broad issues of earlier years, rooted in or relevant to the anniversary year, will be welcome. The conference coordinator is Prof. Thomas Kelly II, Department of History, Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, New York 12211–1462, telephone 518-783-2512, fax 518-786-5052, e-mail: legendziewic@siena.edu. The deadline for submitting abstracts is 15 November 1998, and final papers are due by 15 March 1999.

Letters to the Editor

Prof. Stephen G. Fritz of East Tennessee State University commented in a letter to the editor published in the previous issue of Army History *on the article by Lt. Col. Douglas E. Nash,* "The Forgotten Soldier: *Unmasked,*" *and more particularly on the response to that article by Lt. Col. Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., both of which appeared in the Summer 1997 issue. The following are excerpts from a reply to Dr. Fritz that Colonel Kennedy shared with the editor:*

Dear Dr. Fritz:

Your letter of support for Doug Nash, "Guy Sajer," and *The Forgotten Soldier* is interesting, but it still completely misses my point. My argument was, and is, that discerning readers should never accept everything in print as "truth" just because they like the story, especially historians. Just because one of the many publishers of *The Forgotten Soldier* assumes it is an autobiography does not make it so.

The Forgotten Soldier has a number of errors of fact. I do not believe that these errors are, as you suggest, "relatively minor" or "military minutiae."

I've worn shoulder patches since 1971 on my Army uniforms, and they hardly have the same significance as the cuff titles did for elite German units. ***All*** U.S. Army units wear unit patches, "elite" or not. ***Not all*** German units did (or do) wear cuff titles. I cannot imagine that the location of that insignia is merely a mistake of left from right. To the Germans its wear was extremely significant. To underrate this issue is to show a lack of knowledge of the German military. This issue absolutely must be analyzed within the context of a German soldier's perspective, not our modern-day American perspective, where matters such as uniform accoutrements may be portrayed as inconsequential. If his cuff title was on his left sleeve, maybe he really was in the Waffen SS, as Brassey's portrays on the cover photograph of its edition of the book. This might be a valid reason for him to keep his war record and real identity a secret.

I have dealt with a number of other authors and their books and never had one fail to accommodate me in some form regarding questions or requests. Charles MacDonald, General von Mellenthin, General Aubrey Newman, and General Leon Degrelle had no problems verifying points or substantiating issues. It is a *non sequitur* to think that my polite request for simple information from Sajer was harassment unless there is something to hide. My feeling is that his provision of the requested information would only verify without a doubt that Sajer was not a *Grossdeutschland* veteran.

I don't need to see and touch Sajer's *Wehrpass* or identity disk to believe he was in the *Grossdeutschland*. All I would like to have are some substantive, verifiable facts and not clever rationalizations and a milieu of excuses from his proxy defenders. History is not a matter of religion where faith is all that is required to believe. Facts are the basis of our knowledge. With "Sajer" still alive we ought to be able to get some real evidence, not suppositions and evasive counterarguments, to support his claim that he served with the *Grossdeutschland*.

Lt. Col. Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.
U.S. Army, Retired

Editor:

The Fall/Winter edition's feature article, "A Telephone Switchboard Operator with the A.E.F. in France," was an outstanding literary work. The story proceeds through the war years in quite a realistic fashion. I could almost hear those depth charges at the crossing and comprehend the frustration and wrath of that arrogant Major Roach. The trials and tribulations of female volunteers illustrate the fortitude, integrity, and dedication of young women of that era. As bilingual switchboard operators, they provided a significant and vital service during a war in which they were desperately needed. The recognition of these women with credit for military service and the award of the Victory Medal demonstrate the beginning recognition of women as active participants in world affairs. The memoirs of Mr. Wyman's mother provide a unique and valid insight into a significant historical event. I look forward to more of your publication's very fine articles.

Col. Dolores J. Haritos
U.S. Air Force, Retired

Editor:

I wish to make a few things quite clear about the article "*The Forgotten Soldier*: Unmasked" by Lt. Col. Douglas Nash [*Army History*, no. 42 (Summer 1997)]. Trying to justify the otherwise unjustifiable errors and omissions made by Sajer, Colonel Nash himself makes some mistakes:

1) Quoting Georg Tessin's *Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1945*, Colonel Nash claims that in July 1942 Guy Sajer may have been evaluated at the "103d Stuka training squadron" near the town of Biblis (now Bilina in the Czech Republic), sixty-five kilometers from Chemnitz. In the fourteenth volume of Tessin's masterpiece, page 432, we find the complete history of the 103d *Schlachtgeschwader* (a ground attack wing, not a *Sturzkampfgeschwader*, a dive bomber wing equipped with JU–87s like Rudel's), which was formed in October 1943 and located in Biblis only in February 1945.

2) "What could be more human, more believable, than forgetting such things or misremembering them twenty-two years beyond the events?" Colonel Nash asks. In fact, Sajer began to write his "memoirs" in 1952 (p. 8 of the French edition), seven years after the end of the war. I doubt that a real *Grossdeutschland* Division veteran could forget so many things in such a short period of time.

3) There was no 17th *Abteilung* in the organizational chart of the *Infanterie Division (mot.) Grossdeutschland* dated 1 April 1942, published on pages 36–37 of *Panzercorps Grossdeutschland* by Helmuth Späte r (Friedberg, 1984). There is a 17th Company in each of the two infantry regiments and a 17th Column in the Support Command. Neither of them can be misinterpreted as a battalion. As regards the 5th Company Sajer was assigned to on the eve of Operation *ZITADELLE* (p. 171 of Brassey's 1990 edition), this is too vague to be a proof of authenticity. All divisional units have a 5th Company here or there.

4) Another proof of the fictional nature of Sajer's work comes from Chapter 4 of the book dealing with his leave in Berlin in June 1943. According to his account, he and his girlfriend Paula witnessed a massive daytime air raid on the German capital's outskirts "which flattened a third of the airfield and ninety percent of Templehof" (p. 149). A few days before, the author's journey to his home in Alsace had been stopped "in the flames of Magdeburg" (p. 129). Even on this occasion the veracity of Sajer's memoir is disproved by recently published German official sources. In fact, volume 7 of *Die Geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtsführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1939–1945* (Osnabrück, 1988), pp. 3–81, reports that neither Berlin nor Magdeburg was attacked by the RAF or USAAF in June 1943. The first daytime air raid on Berlin by the U.S. Eighth Air Force occurred only in March 1944. The British Bomber Command bombed the Tempelhof area on the nights of 23–24 August and 31 August–1 September 1943 without any success and hit the airfield (with two high explosive bombs) only on the night of 22–23 December 1943.

As Colonel Kennedy writes in his rebuttal of Nash's allegations, "Nash implies the errors are minor; they are critical and undermine the credibility of the book" [*Army History*, no. 42 (Summer 1997), p. 21]. We cannot mistake this well-written novel for the autobiography of a real *Grossdeutschland* veteran.

Dr. Giuseppe Finizio
Parma, Italy

Book Reviews

Book Review
by Terrence J. Gough

Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865-1919
by Paul A. C. Koistinen
University Press of Kansas, 1997, 414 pp., $45.00.

Paul A. C. Koistinen defines "the political economy of American warfare" as "the interrelationships of the political, economic, and military institutions in devising the means to mobilize resources for defense and to conduct war." With the publication in 1996 of *Beating Plowshares into Swords*, which covered the colonial period through the Civil War, he inaugurated a pro-

jected five-volume series that represents the first comprehensive treatment of this significant subject. *Mobilizing for Modern War*, the second volume, continues both Koistinen's effort to show how economic mobilization has reflected and affected American society and his attempt to "expand on the study of military history." Future volumes will examine the interwar years, World War II, and the post-1945 period.

Koistinen's interpretive framework for the series posits three major historical stages in U.S. economic mobilization: preindustrial, the colonial period to 1815; transitional, 1816–1865; and industrial, since 1865. (Readers who would include the Civil War in the third stage should refer to the first volume for Koistinen's detailed defense of his periodization.) He sensibly proposes that each of these stages resulted from changes in the development of the economy, the federal government, the military, and technology. More problematically, he appraises the central role in economic mobilization of political, economic, and military "elites."

Dealing with the period between the end of the Civil War and the U.S. entry into World War I, Koistinen devotes about a third of *Mobilizing for Modern War* to surveying major economic, political, military (both Army and Navy), and technological developments and the mobilization for the Spanish-American War. Here he relies on a usually careful reading of a wide array of published sources. His summaries of logistical efforts in 1898 and of developing Army professionalism are particularly good, though limited by the literature's general narrowness on the dynamics of logistical professionalization. In the rest of the book, which focuses on preparedness and economic mobilization for World War I, he supplements printed sources with selective archival research. Notable in the economic and political realms are his excellent explanations of the central role of J. P. Morgan and Co. in Allied purchasing in the United States and the growth of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its relationship with the federal government. Such acute handling of particular aspects of the story is the work's greatest strength.

Less satisfying are interpretive twists designed to fit the thesis that economic mobilization for World War I integrated the military services into an existing and increasingly menacing partnership between government and business. Koistinen claims that beginning in the late nineteenth century, estranged civilian and military elites drew together to cope with the technological revolution in weaponry. But he is then forced by obvious evidence to qualify the statement out of existence insofar as it concerns the technologically laggard Army. What constitutes a military elite is never clear.

Robert Cuff's penetrating work on the War Industries Board (WIB) of 1917–18 fully justifies Koistinen's portrayal of the board as a "rather crude and inefficient planning mechanism." Describing the WIB's dozens of semiautonomous commodity sections, Koistinen admits with striking understatement that "fifty-seven centers of power instead of one gave the board a decentralized quality." Yet he insists implausibly that government, business, and military representatives used the board to achieve "centralized control over a planned economy." He further contends that the General Staff's chief logistician, Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals, considered cooperation with the board essential. Actually, Goethals viewed the WIB warily as a possible impediment to the Army's attainment of its materiel requirements.

Conceptually constrained by an insistent search for "the historical roots of the military-industrial complex," Koistinen misses an opportunity to explore in depth the causes and effects of the palpable civil-military strains that marked the period he treats. His research, estimable in many respects, flags in the crucial area of Army-WIB relations in the last eight months of World War I. The workaday records of the WIB commodity sections and Army commodity committees, which Koistinen cites very sparsely, lend little support to his claim of significant civil-military integration by the end of the war.

Those interested in the history of business-government interaction will find much of value in this volume. But students of civil-military relations will be frustrated by invocations of undefined military "elites" and unconvincing assertions of portentous Army-business cooperation in the contentious mobilization of 1917–18. The only expansion of military history here, in the service of socioeconomic criticism, is Procrustean.

Dr. Terrence J. Gough, chief of the Center's Historical Support Branch, is writing a book on Army-business relations in the industrial mobilization for World War I.

Book Review
by Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

The Korean War: An Encyclopedia
Edited by Stanley Sandler
Garland Publishing, 1995, 450 pp., $75.00

With the fiftieth anniversary commemoration of the Korean War in the offing, Garland Publishing, Inc., has produced a timely work in *The Korean War: An Encyclopedia*. This title joins a series of encyclopedias from Garland covering the colonial wars in North America, the American Revolution, the Spanish-American War and subsequent American interventions through 1934, America's participation in World War I, and the European powers during World War I.

Stanley Sandler, a historian at the Army's Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, has edited the work of sixty-three contributors to produce this reference work on what the publisher describes as "America's first ideological conflict." Understandably, the emphasis of the book is on military subjects. The corporate objective for the individual contributors was to produce neutral essays (each with a useful mini-bibliography) with a minimum of interpretation. There is, however, a thoughtful five-page introduction. Then follows a helpful chronology of Korean history, beginning not with the hostilities of 1950 but around 2000 B.C. with the establishment of the "land of the morning calm." Those familiar with the Center of Military History's Korean War titles will recognize most of the thirteen maps in this volume.

If there are grounds to cavil, perhaps it is with the illustrations. The thirty-five photographs do not accompany any of the articles but appear to have been randomly selected and randomly placed—between the letters L and M. One of the photgraphs purports to show a "Lockheed F–84." Republic Aviation built the F–84; the photograph appears to be a Lockheed F–80 Shooting Star.

This is, all in all, a useful reference work. Students of the Korean War certainly will want to consider it, as should those responsible for library acquisitions.

Dr. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., was a historian at the Center of Military History from 1979 to 1997 and managing editor of Army History *for the last seven of those years. He is the author of* Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950 *(Center of Military History, 1988).*

Book Review
by Richard W. Stewart

SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam
by John L. Plaster
Simon and Schuster, cloth, 1997, 384 pp., $25.00; Signet Books, paper, July 1998, 384 pp., $6.99.

Retired Maj. John L. Plaster's book chronicling the exploits of U.S. soldiers involved in reconnaissance and strike operations in Southeast Asia is an excellent read that provides lots of excitement and color as it re-creates the sense of tension generated by a mission behind enemy lines. For this reason alone it deserves a place on any historian's bookshelf. Having said that, what it is *not* is a comprehensive history of the organization known as the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG). The book touches only lightly on agent operations, maritime operations, psychological operations, and a host of other secret projects. It provides no organizational numbers, charts, or schemes. It does not offer extensive quotes from documents (many of which still lie in classified vaults for no good reason), nor does it bother with footnotes or detailed sources. It includes a bibliography of mostly secondary sources and lists those who were interviewed but does not indicate in the text which source provided which fact.

As such, this is not a history book. It is a useful and interesting memoir of the author's personal stake in SOG operations along with stories and anecdotes of some of the other participants in cross-border reconnaissance. It is not an objective study and does not purport to be. It could have been more of a history by using the critical tool available to any serious student of the past: more primary sources linked to footnotes that would allow other researchers to test and verify information. I would hope that Major Plaster will make the transcripts of his interviews available to other researchers in this field.

This is still a very useful book, as long as one

understands the above-listed limitations. Concentrating on cross-border ground operations, Major Plaster has talked to dozens of veterans of these high risk (and high cost) missions. They almost certainly opened up to him, a fellow veteran of these operations, more than they would have to anyone who was not part of their brotherhood. For capturing their stories alone, Major Plaster deserves our thanks.

The stories Plaster tells are vibrant with the "routine" courage of some exceptional soldiers. He highlights the actions of heroes unknown today, whose exploits would be on every schoolchild's lips had they occurred during World War II. The late Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Fred Zabitosky, awarded the Medal of Honor for superhuman bravery and courage, is remembered at Fort Bragg but unknown outside the community. Col. Robert Howard, who probably deserves the title "bravest of the brave" more than any man alive today, is not adequately remembered or honored by the nation for which he risked death on dozens of occasions, although his name remains a byword for courage within Special Operations. It would be difficult for even a historian to remain objective when chronicling the stories of such men; it was impossible for one of their comrades. Major Plaster does not claim to strive for such objectivity; his mission is to tell the story of his comrades, and in this he succeeds very well.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart has been Director, History and Museums, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, since 1990. He will become chief of the Histories Division at the Center of Military History in June 1998. Stewart is the author of Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950 *(Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1991) and* The English Ordnance Office, 1585–1625: A Case Study in Bureaucracy *(Rochester, N.Y., 1996).*

Book Review
by Clifford F. Porter

Germany's Panzer Arm
By R. L. DiNardo
Greenwood Press, 1997, 176 pp., $55.00.

In this small volume, R. L. DiNardo continues his theme, begun in earlier work, that the German Army under Hitler was a weapon more of the nineteenth century than the twentieth. This book is a detailed, driven discussion of Germany's panzers as a branch of service, rather than a catalog of armor exploits in combat. DiNardo's conclusion is that the German Army, even in one of its most advanced arms, was still a pre-modern, nineteenth century force both technologically and doctrinally.

DiNardo begins his discussion with a chapter on the inability of the German economy to support a large, modern, mechanized army—in terms of technical expertise, material production, and availability of mechanics and even drivers. Given Hitler's insistence on building a navy, German resources were too meager to build a truly modern, mechanical army; consequently, the German Army invaded its neighbors primarily by foot or horse, and its few armored formations were always short of tanks and mechanized support. With all the discussion about how the navy and the *Luftwaffe* wasted resources, the reader expects, but does not receive, a discussion of how concentration camps wasted resources. However, it is a moot point; Hitler wasted resources for ideological reasons. Without the ideology, the Nazis would never have seized power.

The heart of this book is in the chapters on training, doctrine, and organization. These chapters could be interesting to current armor specialists, but their lack of depth is disappointing. There are few historical insights or lessons for current armor training, doctrine, or organization.

DiNardo argues, in the very short chapter on training, that the German Army emphasized a tradition of small-unit and individual initiative drawn from the imperial army of World War I, thus reinforcing the nineteenth century image. The chapter on doctrine is really a long debunking of the reputations of Basil Liddell Hart and Heinz Guderian as interwar armor theorists. DiNardo concludes that German panzer theory is best understood in the nineteenth century tradition of Clausewitz, Moltke, and Schlieffen, which certainly is a strong tradition. It is perhaps better to say that the German Army emphasized timeless principles of initiative and the offensive.

The chapter on organization has the most new information. The German Army and SS units tried several different organizational schemes before and during the war. They were never able to iron out all the

problems because combined arms warfare was still relatively new, and the war required ad hoc formations because of special needs, notably a scarcity of armor. The Germans were, nonetheless, masters at adapting to circumstances, most dramatically demonstrated by their *Kampfgruppen*. *Kampfgruppen* were essentially combined arms teams that were usually built around the combat striking power of armor; as such, they paralleled U.S. Army regimental combat teams of World War II or modern task forces. The success of combined arms teams depended—and still does depend—on initiative and the ability of the maneuver commander to recognize the capabilities of his combat power in concert with varied arms, such as engineers, artillery, or infantry—which is within the tradition of Clausewitz and Moltke.

DiNardo provides the reader with an avalanche of interesting details, but he ultimately does not elaborate enough about training, doctrine, and organization, which would be illuminating for current students in the armor or combined arms service schools. This might be grounds for further research.

DiNardo also sets up straw men, just to knock them down. Perhaps putting Guderian in his place has a purpose, but labeling the *Wehrmacht* as a nineteenth century anachronism is not helpful. What distinguishes nineteenth from twentieth century warfare is not only tanks; twentieth century warfare is characterized by technological advances in firepower—such as machine guns and massed artillery—and also the unrestrained assault on noncombatants. What is remarkable about the German Army is that it was able to avoid a trench stalemate in the first half of the war, and it did it with limited armor resources, against superior forces, and in spite of the expectations of most expert military analysts. Of course, it also relied on terror.

To the patient reader, DiNardo's book has a wealth of sources and details about Germany's emerging panzer arm and provides a portrait of how initiative and ingenuity took German panzers into military legend on limited resources. The reader, however, should not lose sight of the fact that initiative and ingenuity were in the service of an ideologically evil regime.

Prof. Clifford Porter teaches European history at California State University, Fullerton. He is an Army Reserve infantry lieutenant in the 3d Battalion, 362d Regiment, an element of the 91st Division (Exercise).

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